Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Read online

  At the time, Syed Husin Ali was puzzled why the police wanted him to implicate Dr. Mahathir and Musa. Only much later, after he had spent six years in detention accused of helping the Communist Party and disseminating subversive ideas among students, did he figure it out. If he had been tempted to take the bait of an early release and falsely confirm their part in subversion, Ghazali Shafie would have been a giant step closer to the prime ministership.

  Although the anti-communist campaign fizzled after the death in early 1977 of Syed Jaafar Albar, Dr. Mahathir lived in "constant fear of being arrested on the orders of his hidden enemies" and his succession "remained uncertain even when he was very nearly there", according to an associate.[54] Ghazali made one final attempt to discredit Dr. Mahathir. Three days before he was to be installed as prime minister, his political secretary for seven years, Siddiq Mohamed Ghouse, 43, was arrested for allegedly spying for the Soviet Union, and three Soviet diplomats were expelled from Malaysia. Ghazali said Siddiq, a journalist by training and head of an UMNO Youth branch, had sold secrets for money to KGB agents, who supplied him with cameras, bags with secret compartments and a radio they used to contact him. Siddiq had not damaged security because he did not have access to top-secret documents, Ghazali said. But Ghazali did not explain why Siddiq had been picked up only in 1981 when he had been suspected of spying since 1979. Long after, Dr. Mahathir agreed that the dramatic arrest could have been timed to stop him taking over as prime minister. "The action against Siddiq might have [had] that intention," he said. "So it would seem he was another agent of influence who has been placed in my office, and therefore I might be subject to this leftist influence."[55]

  As his political allies and others were being rounded up, Dr. Mahathir had told journalist friends repeatedly he did not believe they were guilty.[56] Two weeks after becoming prime minister, with Musa as his deputy and home affairs minister, Dr. Mahathir released 21 people being held under the Internal Security Act, including those sacrificed in Ghazali's desperate bid for power. Some were broken in health, spirit and financially by the time they were freed. Others who survived incarceration in better shape, notably Samad Ismail and Abdullah Ahmad, returned to prominent positions. Samad worked as editorial adviser to his old newspaper group, received an honorary doctorate from a university that lauded him as a "champion of the Malay language, and a political activist and genuine nationalist", and was knighted by Malaysia's king.[57] Abdullah resumed his political career as a member of parliament and later was appointed editor-in-chief of the New Straits Times publishing group.

  Dr. Mahathir had a fairly miserable five years as deputy prime minister, quite apart from dodging Ghazali's bullets. Although Hussein Onn had chosen Dr. Mahathir as his deputy, he did not seem to like him personally and often ignored him. In Dr. Mahathir's assessment, Hussein treated Ghazali Shafie and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah as de facto deputy premiers, consulting Ghazali on defence and security, and Tengku Razaleigh on economics, finance and party affairs.[58]

  Theoretically the second most powerful man in Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir found his title counted for almost nothing with Number One. Under the impression that "I had influence with him", Dr. Mahathir went to see Hussein to persuade him not to proceed with the prosecution of Harun Idris for corruption. "He took out the file from his safe and banged it on the table," said Dr. Mahathir. "Then I realized that, although I may be the deputy prime minister, my standing is not that high." Hussein got just as angry when Dr. Mahathir tried to persuade him to re-examine Abdullah Ahmad's case.[59] At times, relations between Hussein and Dr. Mahathir almost broke down. Musa Hitam recalled visiting the deputy prime minister's office when Dr. Mahathir was complaining about Hussein. "I lifted the phone and said, 'Talk to him. You're the deputy. Talk to him'. No, no, no. He never did."[60]

  It was extremely frustrating for Dr. Mahathir, who was already bursting with many of the ideas that would mark his leadership. He advocated a freeway to run the length of peninsular Malaysia, a single time zone for the country and the establishment of a heavy industries corporation.[61] Not only did Hussein dismiss most of Dr. Mahathir's proposals out of hand, he also considered some a joke, for instance, describing the suggestion for Japanese-style international trading houses, sogo shosha, as sunggoh susah, very difficult, in Malay.[62]

  So close to the pinnacle, Dr. Mahathir was still treated as an outsider. Steeped in traditional values, Hussein appreciated the relationship with Tengku Razaleigh, because they were both royalty and had studied law together in London, and their late fathers were friends. At Dr. Mahathir's request, Tengku Razaleigh intervened with Hussein to ask that some of the deputy prime minister's proposals be allowed to go to the Cabinet for other ministerial opinions. "And, of course, he agreed, you know," Tengku Razaleigh said. "You go up to him and explain to him nicely, he'll accept it." That left Dr. Mahathir "very unhappy with me", Tengku Razaleigh said. "He thought that he being deputy prime minister couldn't get things through, but I could go and whisper to Hussein and everything was OK."[63]

  Not only was there no personal chemistry between leader and deputy, they also had starkly contrasting styles. Whereas Dr. Mahathir was keen to remake the country from top to bottom, Hussein was cautious to the point of dithering. When reading a brief, he underlined key words three or four times. Loath to make a tough decision before consulting all parties, he would usually agree to "consider it" as a way of postponing an outcome. One of his favourite expressions was, "OK, I'll sleep over it."[64] He once advised Dr. Mahathir that "when you have a problem, just don't do anything"; it would go away, he said.[65]

  Even when Hussein reached a decision, he might have second thoughts. For example, Dr. Mahathir persuaded him that Malaysia should strengthen its claim to part of the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea by occupying Amboyna Cay. With the navy ready to move in, Hussein "changed his mind one week later", said Dr. Mahathir.[66] The Vietnamese beat the Malaysians to the punch and established a permanent presence on the cay.

  In a cabinet shuffle in 1978, Dr. Mahathir relinquished the education portfolio and became minister for trade and industry, where he was happy to proceed with some of his plans that did not require government policy changes. He established a heavy industries corporation within his ministry, and minimized his unhappiness with Hussein by spending time abroad selling Malaysia. Dr. Mahathir's four years as education minister were remembered for the tough stand he had taken against student and academic protests. He forced scholarship holders to sign guarantees that they would not become involved in politics, and amended the Universities Act to give the government extensive disciplinary powers over staff and students who were politically active.[67]

  Eventually, Hussein fell victim to his own philosophy. As the work piled up, elements in UMNO defied his weak leadership by forcing the readmission of Harun Idris to UMNO, after Hussein had insisted on his expulsion following his conviction on corruption charges. Although Harun's court appeals failed in early 1978 and he went to jail, Hussein was being pressed to pardon him. At the 1978 UMNO General Assembly, Hussein was humiliated by being challenged for the presidency of the party by Sulaiman Palestin, the UMNO publicity chief, who secured just over one-fifth of the votes. While Sulaiman was not a serious contender for national leadership, his candidacy was an act of defiance by Harun supporters. As a friend of Sulaiman who opposed Harun's prosecution and felt thwarted under Hussein, Dr. Mahathir had reason to support the dissident challenge covertly, as rumoured, and dissuade the prime minister from being tempted to seek a second term. While Dr. Mahathir denied doing so,[68] as acting premier he sought a pardon for Harun from Malaysia's king during Hussein's absence in London for a heart bypass operation in early 1981.[69]

  The pressure on Hussein built relentlessly, and after the operation he announced his retirement, citing ill health. Hussein told friends his memory began failing after the surgery.[70] But in any case he could not cope with the job. When Dr. Mahathir took over on 16 July 1981, he was handed not
one but 18 red dispatch boxes, used to carry pending files between the office and home, which were awaiting attention.[71]

  Notes

  John Funston, "Political Careers of Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim: Parallel, Intersecting and Conflicting Lives", IKMAS Working Papers (Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), no. 15 July 1998): i-iv, 1-32.

  Parliamentary Debates, Malaysia, 26 May 1965, cited in Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 20.

  Ibid., p. 19.

  Parliamentary Debates, Malaysia, 26 May 1965, cited in Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 (Singapore: Times Media Pte. Ltd., 2000), pp. 274-275.

  Robin Adshead, Mahathir of Malaysia: Statesman and Leader (London: Hibiscus Publishing Company, 1989), p. 54.

  Interview with Musa Hitam, 3 January 2007.

  Tunku Halim, Tunku Abdullah: A Passion for Life (Kuala Lumpur: All Media Publications Sdn. Bhd., 1998), "Foreword", unnumbered.

  Interview with Tunku Abdullah Tuanku Abdul Rahman, 22 March 2007. Tunku Abdullah passed away on 20 August 2008.

  John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO & PAS (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1980), pp. 2-3.

  Ibid., pp. 2-10.

  Ibid., pp. 12-17.

  Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, "Disparities: Helpful Suggestions Needed", in The Early Years: 1947-1972 (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing Sdn. Bhd., 1995), pp. 133-136.

  Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970 (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing Sdn. Bhd., 1985), p. 105. Interview with AbdullanAhmad, 1 August 2008. Dr. Mahathir confirmed Ismail's comments: email correspondence with Mahathir Mohamad, 20 August 2008.

  Karl von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 372.

  Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, 23 March 2007.

  Ibid.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 14 August 2007.

  Interview with Siti Hasmah Mohamad Ali, 17 January 2008.

  Interview with Mukhriz Mahathir, 22 March 2007.

  Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970, p. 19.

  Interview with Shaari Daud, 27 February 2007.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 31 March 2008.

  Ibid.

  Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism, p. 23.

  Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Singapore: Times Books International, 1999 edition).

  John Funston, "Political Careers of Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim: Parallel, Intersecting and Conflicting Lives".

  Ibid.

  Dr. Mahathir stood by his controversial views that Malays were disadvantaged by hereditary and environmental factors. Asked in retirement if he disowned his arguments in view of scientific evidence, he said, "No. I think there is a basis for that." Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 14 August 2007. Only on one point, that the Malays lacked the ability and confidence to succeed, did he change his mind. "I admit that at the time I felt very disappointed. I spoke to many people my age then who did not have the confidence. I too was not confident that Malays could achieve success. Now I reverse my stand. I no longer believe what I had written in The Malay Dilemma," he said. "We Can Do It: Dr. M No Longer Holds to Views Expressed in 'Malay Dilemma'", Star, 12 May 1997.

  Cited in John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia, p. 255.

  Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, p. 79.

  Zainuddin Maidin, The Other Side of Mahathir (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn. Bhd., 1994), p. 44.

  Ooi Kee Beng, The Reluctant Politician: Tun Dr. Ismail and his Time (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 268-269.

  John Funston, "Political Careers of Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim: Parallel, Intersecting and Conflicting Lives".

  Shamsul A.B., "UMNO's Politics: Past and Present", in Trends no. 39, distributed in Business Times, 27-28 November 1993.

  Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, 23 March 2007.

  Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, 26 February 2007.

  The chief minister of a Malay state formally is called the mentri besar.

  Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, 26 February 2007.

  Interviews with Abdullah Ahmad, 26 February, 23 March 2007.

  Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, 30 May 2007.

  Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 132.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 14 August 2007.

  Ibid.

  Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 21 March 2007.

  Musa Hitam, "We Were Followers", Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 October 2003, http://www.feer.com/articles/2003/0310_09/p024region.html (accessed 19 January 2006).

  Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 29 May 2007.

  Barry Wain, "Malaysia Ex-Premier Still Keeps His Hand On the Nation's Pulse", Asian Wall Street Journal, 12 May 1977.

  Asia 1977 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd., p. 228.

  Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, 23 March 2007.

  Interview with Musa Hitam, 3 January 2007.

  Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, 26 February 2007.

  Interview with Musa Hitam, 3 January 2007.

  S. Husin Ali, Two Faces (Detention Without Trial) (Petaling Jaya: INSAN, 1996), p.l09.

  Zainuddin Maidin, The Other Side of Mahathir, pp. 73-74.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 20 March 2007.

  Zainuddin Maidin, The Other Side of Mahathir, p. 73.

  Samad Ismail passed away on 4 September 2008, aged 84.

  Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, 30 May 2007.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 14 August 2007.

  Interview with Musa Hitam, 3 January 2007.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 14 August 2007.

  Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 29 May 2007.

  Ibid.

  Interview with Musa Hitam, 3 January 2007.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 31 March 2008.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 14 August 2007.

  John Funston, "Political Careers of Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim: Parallel, Intersecting and Conflicting Lives".

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 31 March 2008.

  Zainuddin Maidin, The Other Side of Mahathir, p. 72.

  Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 21 March 2007.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 31 March 2008.

  * * *

  Part II

  Prime Minister for Life, Almost

  * * *

  (3)

  From Outcast to Presidential Premier

  Although he swept into office with the intensity of a typhoon, Dr. Mahathir moved cautiously to consolidate his position as leader of both UMNO and Malaysia. Taking command of the political party that had expelled him 12 years earlier, he had to contend with adversaries who regarded him as a usurper to be opportunistically deposed. While introducing activist domestic and foreign policies and managing a spate of financial scandals, he gave little indication initially that he would rewrite the political rulebook and become the longest-serving and most controversial premier in the nation's history.

  As Dr. Mahathir imposed his forceful personality and priorities on the political system and the country, however, he engaged in bitter contests with UMNO pretenders, resulting in two major upheavals. After barely retaining the presidency in an election in 1987 that split the party in half, he drove out his enemies and rebuilt UMNO according to his requirements. Engineering procedures within the party so that he would never again be threatened, he turned annual meetings into orchestrated, made-for-TV productions that showcased his supremacy and presented an image of unity. His crude dismissal and persecution of his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998 irrevocably tar
nished Dr. Mahathir's credibility and created a crisis of legitimacy for UMNO among the Malays, but still he managed to retain his authority, select a successor and retire at a time of his own choosing.

  Simultaneously, Dr. Mahathir weakened state and informal institutions and packed them with loyalists to facilitate his autocratic rule. In the most egregious case, he intervened to subdue the judiciary and ensure it would yield the results he sought when his political control was endangered. In the National Front government, the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress — stalwarts from the early days when they, with UMNO, constituted the ruling Alliance — found themselves downgraded. Across the years, Dr. Mahathir transformed the regime in Malaysia into a highly institutionalized party-state that he personally operated, manipulated and dominated. Dr. Mahathir and Malaysia not only had phonetic consonance,[1] but also shared an eerily similar eight-character identity, and were at times virtually synonymous.

  Although Dr. Mahathir did not murder adversaries, as did some other Southeast Asian strongmen, he ruled in familiar authoritarian fashion. He selectively jailed without trial legitimate political opponents and civil society critics, as well as genuine terrorists and subversives. Impatient, he had no end of ideas about how to build Malaysia into a modern industrialized nation, but allowed nobody of stature to question his plans. The Malaysian media, run by his acolytes, functioned as an amen chorus, ever ready to lavish praise on the leader and ignore or discredit dissenting voices.