Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Page 6

  According to the official target, Malays and other indigenous people would own and manage at least 30 per cent of the "total commercial and industrial activities in all categories and scales of operations". The government also stipulated that the employment pattern, "at all levels and in all sectors", must reflect the racial composition of the population.[29] The share of national corporate equity held by Malays and other native races was to increase from 2.4 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent in 1990. In practice, the wide application of the 30 per cent quota was broadly in line with Dr. Mahathir's argument that equality required that "each race is represented in every strata of society, in every field of work, in proportion more or less to their percentage of the population".[30] Although he played no part in formulating the economic blueprint, Dr. Mahathir was godfather to the NEP and would always be strongly identified with it in the public mind.

  With Tunku Abdul Rahman in retirement, the way was open for Razak to rehabilitate Dr. Mahathir, which he did by readmitting him to UMNO on 7 March 1972. A Malay-Ianguage newspaper cartoon depicting his return as Superman, descending from the skies to be met by all members of UMNO's Supreme Council, arms outstretched in welcome, irritated some of them who did not want him back.[31] Among those who agreed to his re-admission only reluctantly was a fellow physician, Ismail Abdul Rahman, the highly principled deputy prime minister and home affairs minister, who felt Dr. Mahathir had gone too far in his criticism of the Tunku.[32]

  After such a tumultuous, decade-long prelude — and partly because of it — Dr. Mahathir's ascent was meteoric. He re-entered Parliament in 1973, appointed to the Senate by Kedah state, and was returned to the House of Representatives in a general election the following year. Immediately made a full minister, bypassing the normal progression from a deputy position, he served in a coalition government that had been broadened by Prime Minister Razak beyond the original Alliance to become the multi-party National Front. As PAS had renamed itself Parti Islam Se-Malaysia and joined the administration, Dr. Mahathir could not contest his old seat, but moved instead to another Kedah constituency, Kubang Pasu, where he was unopposed. Significantly, his portfolio was education, a particular interest of his and a post that gave him the opportunity to entrench his support among schoolteachers, then the most important group in UMNO.[33] It was seen as a logical stepping stone to higher office. Dr. Mahathir formally abandoned medicine after 20 years of practice and relocated his family from Alor Star to Kuala Lumpur.

  In UMNO, Dr. Mahathir was immediately embroiled in a vicious factional fight that convulsed the party in the aftermath of Tunku Abdul Rahman's induced retirement. While Dr. Mahathir's allies, the "development-oriented reformists", or leftists, aligned with Razak, were in control, the Tunku's "independence fighters", or conservatives, were mounting a serious rearguard action.[34] Separated mainly by generation and ideology, the two factions often referred to each other in abusive terms: The Old Guard called some of Razak's inner circle "communists", while the Young Turks reciprocated by referring to Tunku's men as "American stooges".[35]

  Dr. Mahathir was elected to the UMNO Supreme Council with the highest vote only months after being accepted back into the party in 1972, though he failed in a simultaneous bid for the vice presidency. But with the decision to hold future UMNO elections triennially rather than annually, the real test of factional strength would come in 1975, and the outcome would shape Malaysian politics for a generation or more. Three years of intense politicking was heightened by the unexpected death in 1973, from a heart attack, of Deputy Prime Minister Ismail. Razak appointed Hussein Onn, his brother-in-law, to fill the vacancy, but it was generally understood that Hussein would be an interim deputy. Adding pressure was the fact that Razak himself was dying of leukemia, though only a few people knew that and they were sworn to secrecy. Diagnosed in 1969 and given four years at most to live, Razak was already on borrowed time. Ismail's death at 57 had robbed him of his logical successor as prime minister, and left him scrambling to assemble a future leadership for the country before he died.

  As the UMNO General Assembly approached in 1975, Razak called in Abdullah Ahmad to discuss tactics for the election of three vice presidents. These posts were considered crucial, as one occupant before long would move up to deputy president and then party president, giving him the prime ministership. Abdullah, a former journalist, was a deputy minister in the Prime Minister's Department and a member of UMNO's Supreme Council, who functioned as Razak's de facto political adviser, confidant and hatchet man. Razak was specific. Of the eight candidates, he wanted elected, in order: Abdul Ghafar Baba, minister for national and rural development, and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, chairman of state-owned Bank Bumiputra, both incumbents; and Dr. Mahathir, the education minister. Ghafar and Dr. Mahathir were tightly aligned with Razak. Tengku Razaleigh, a businessman-banker who owed his rise in the party to Razak's sponsorship, positioned himself in the centre of the ideological struggle.[36]

  Razak was equally adamant who was to be stopped: Syed Jaafar Albar, dubbed the Lion of UMNO, and Harun Idris, UMNO Youth leader and chief minister of Selangor state,[37] who were hard-core Tunku supporters; Muhammad Ghazali Shafie, the home affairs minister, regarded by the Razak camp as a political opportunist; and Hamzah Abu Samah, trade and industry minister and another brother-in-law of Razak. Harun, Syed Jaafar Albar and Ghazali were politically unacceptable, while Razak would face accusations of nepotism if Hamzah were elected. Razak told Abdullah to make sure the four did not win "in that order". He said the abrasive Abdullah could "use his big stick" and Razak's name because he did not want them to be elected "at any cost".[38]

  Apart from working the ground at divisional level to get the votes and avoid last-minute defections, Abdullah planned to have Razak influence the outcome of the election by endorsing his three preferred candidates in his opening speech. Alert to that possibility, Tunku supporters on the Supreme Council, at its last meeting before the General Assembly, warned him not to mention personal preferences. As a ploy, Razak suggested that Senu Abdul Rahman, UMNO's secretary general and a known Tunku ally, check a draft of the speech, which Abdullah had prepared. Senu left the room and returned about half an hour later to report finding no mention of names. In fact, Razak's choice of Senu was deliberate, as he was the sort of person without the patience to comb his way line by line through a lengthy document. The names of Ghafar, Tengku Razaleigh and Dr. Mahathir were there, but he missed them. Breaking his promise to the Supreme Council, Razak read that speech, drawing audible objections from a few delegates.[39] The three were duly elected, and in Razak's preferred order.

  Ghazali Shafie, who saw himself as a future prime minister, was particularly upset by his failure to win a vice president's slot. Indeed, the dynamic Ghazali, a former permanent secretary of the foreign ministry who rose to prominence with the National Operations Council during emergency rule, was humiliated to trail the field. Flamboyant and brimming with confidence, however, "King Ghaz" or simply "Ghaz", as he was known, never relinquished his ambition to lead the country, and plotted to make it a reality.

  Ghazali actually found himself in contention when Razak died in January 1976 — unexpectedly, since most people did not know he was ill — and the leadership of Malaysia was thrown wide open. Razak was succeeded by Hussein Onn, who had suffered a heart attack the previous year and was unlikely to remain as prime minister for more than one term. Although party tradition indicated Hussein should choose one of the party's three elected vice presidents, he initially favoured Ghazali. Hussein told associates that Ghazali was familiar with international relations, had the most recognized name in the region and was popular with neighbours such as Indonesia and Singapore.[40]

  In fact, the Indonesian government took the extraordinary step of urging Hussein to appoint Ghazali, rather than Dr. Mahathir, in the interests of enhancing Indonesia-Malaysia relations.[41] The Indonesians were familiar with Ghazali from Confrontation days, when he was Malaysia's prime interlocutor in bilateral ties
. According to Dr. Mahathir, Indonesian intelligence chief Ali Murtopo visited Kuala Lumpur and spoke with Hussein, indicating a preference for Ghazali.[42]

  When Hussein looked like he might bypass Ghafar, Tengku Razaleigh and Dr. Mahathir, they met several times among themselves and then called on him at his office and presented the case for maintaining tradition. He was left in no doubt that they would hesitate to serve in a government in which one of them was not deputy prime minister. Notoriously indecisive, Hussein agonized for more than six weeks over his choice. Ghafar, the most senior vice president, lacked higher education and social graces, and was not comfortable speaking English. Tengku Razaleigh was, in many ways, his ideal: royal, sophisticated and dependable. But, as Tengku Razaleigh himself volunteered, he had several strikes against him. Still under 40, he was on the young side, lacked cabinet experience and was not married, which did not sit well with some Malays. Dr. Mahathir, the most junior of the vice presidents, got the nod.

  Not close to Hussein, Dr. Mahathir was as surprised as anybody. He speculated that Hussein could have relied on some advice an ill Razak gave him. Dr. Mahathir said that when he went to see Hussein, as Razak was being treated in London, Hussein "did tell me that Tun Razak told him if he had any problem to call me".[43] Hussein might also have been influenced by Tengku Razaleigh, who said Hussein had told him privately he was the best person for the job. "I said no," said Tengku Razaleigh, who ruled himself out on grounds of youth, inexperience and his single status. "So I suggested it is Dr. Mahathir."[44] Hussein could have relied, too, on the opinion of Musa Hitam, another cabinet member, who was asked by the prime minister to write an analysis of the merits of every potential deputy premier. "I strongly recommended Dr. Mahathir," Musa said.[45]

  However he reached his decision, Hussein was deeply troubled by his choice of Dr. Mahathir as deputy party president and deputy prime minister. Before announcing it, Hussein called on Tunku Abdul Rahman, who would not have welcomed Dr. Mahathir's promotion. As the Tunku related the story, Hussein arrived at his house in Kuala Lumpur, kissed his hand in the normal greeting, sat down in a chair and stared at the floor. After half an hour, without saying a word, Hussein stood, begged to leave in the usual way, and departed. The Tunku told close friends it was all very strange, but he surmised that the extremely polite and gentlemanly Hussein wanted to explain why he was going to appoint Dr. Mahathir, but could not bring himself to utter the words.[46]

  Ghafar Baba was also unhappy at being bypassed and refused to serve in Hussein's Cabinet, though he kept his senior vice president's post. The most disappointed, however, was Ghazali Shafie who, lacking grassroots appeal in UMNO, had missed what appeared to be a heaven-sent chance to be directly appointed prime minister-in-waiting. Undeterred, Ghazali pressed ahead with one of the most cynical power plays ever conducted in Malaysian politics, designed to stop Dr. Mahathir becoming prime minister and to claim the prize for himself.

  His political cover was the factional fighting within UMNO, which flared anew after Razak's death. Conservatives, who already had been targeting left-leaning members of Razak's "palace guard", smelled blood once he was no longer around to protect them. With the Beijing-backed Malayan Communist Party still engaged in guerrilla warfare against the government, the Tunku's contemporaries criticized Razak's young advisers for his shift towards a non-aligned foreign policy, which included establishing diplomatic relations with China. On the domestic front, the conservatives, basically old-style laissez-faire capitalists, detected creeping socialism as official agencies in support of the NEP proliferated under Razak. While the rallying cry of the Old Guard was subversion at the heart of government, several issues, in reality, were being contested. Among them was an attempt to restore the political fortunes of the popular former chief minister of Selangor, Harun Idris, forced out by Razak for corruption.

  Syed Jaafar Albar, who succeeded Harun as head of UMNO Youth, spearheaded the campaign to root out alleged communist sympathizers in senior government positions. He was joined by Tunku Abdul Rahman, who took revenge on the Razak staffers who had pushed him out in 1969 and ensured he received little coverage in the media in retirement. He found a vehicle in the form of a weekly column he began writing in the Star, owned by a friend's company that the Tunku chaired, which was later acquired by the Malaysian Chinese Association. "In my articles I started to pinpoint these fellows as enemies of the country, and that got the security people working on them," he said.[47] Among those he named were Abdul Samad Ismail, managing editor of the New Straits Times and a major literary figure, and two deputy ministers who had served on Razak's staff, Abdullah Ahmad and Abdullah Majid.

  As home affairs minister in charge of internal security, Ghazali Shafie was only too willing to oblige. In addition to his towering ambition, he had no love for Abdullah Ahmad, who had helped engineer his failure in the vice presidential party stakes in 1975. Ghazali's weapon was the police Special Branch, a political-intelligence unit that kept tabs on enemies of UMNO and the government as religiously as it tracked enemies of the state, its formal mandate. Ghazali went one step further, deploying the Special Branch against his enemies within UMNO under the guise of a threat to national security.

  In June 1976, just five weeks after being honoured by the prime minister with Malaysia's highest literary award, Samad Ismail was arrested as a suspected member of the outlawed Communist Party. He was detained without trial following the arrest of two journalists working for a Malay language paper in Singapore, who said they were part of a communist scheme directed by Samad. After Samad confessed on TV — as political detainees were required to do if they hoped ever to be released — that he had worked for years to subvert the government on the orders of communist agents abroad, Ghazali returned to the forefront of politics. He was the star of UMNO's General Assembly that year, receiving a standing ovation as he assured fellow delegates that the battle against communism was being fought and won.[48]

  Amid calls for Samad's communist network to be dismantled, Abdullah Ahmad came under pressure. He was effectively sidelined by Hussein, who made him deputy minister for science, technology and environment. Summoned by the prime minister, Abdullah was informed that the Special Branch had identified him as a communist "agent of influence" behind the facade of a playboy. Hussein offered Abdullah an ambassadorial post if he agreed to go abroad and give up politics, but later withdrew the offer. He said that while he did not believe Abdullah was a communist, he would have to be detained temporarily.[49]

  In November 1976, Abdullah Ahmad, 36, and Abdullah Majid, 50, deputy minister for labour and manpower, who had worked as Razak's press secretary, were arrested, along with four others. Intimidated by Special Branch officers, the "two Dollahs", as they were known, duly appeared on TV and confessed to communist activity while they held office. As the witch hunt accelerated and widened, Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir and Musa Hitam, minister for primary industries — the ultimate targets — began to feel the heat. The arrest of the two deputy ministers "in itself was attacking us, indirectly," Musa said later.[50]

  Ghazali was able to jail so many people with no real evidence because he had an unwitting accomplice in Prime Minister Hussein Onn. Upright, honest and ill-suited to the rough and tumble of Malay politics, Hussein did not effectively control the UMNO he unexpectedly inherited. Ghazali was one of two cabinet members Hussein relied heavily on for advice, the other being Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. Naively, Hussein accepted Ghazali's reports at face value, as if unaware that the Special Branch used coercion where necessary to extract confessions from political detainees. Some of the detainees, such as Samad Ismail and Abdullah Majid, were easy prey because of their past involvement with the Communist Party during the anti-colonial struggle in Singapore. Had Hussein been alert to prevailing political currents, however, he might have noticed the weaknesses and inconsistencies in the cases against the accused. For a start, Abdullah Majid's confession that part of his work involved writing an article in 1974
praising China's progress sat oddly with the charge that he maintained close contact with Beijing's communist rival, the Soviet Union, through its embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Moreover, the article was published in a government sponsored magazine, which reported in the same issue that Razak intended to open diplomatic relations with China.

  The extent of Hussein's naivete, not to mention the depth of his anti-Soviet paranoia, was apparent when he asked Abdullah Ahmad to understand he had no choice but to detain him. He said he would tell the police to hold Abdullah under house arrest for only six months. Placed in a detention camp and cut off from powerful friends, however, Abdullah was unable to defend himself against increasingly incriminating — and doctored — Special Branch reports. He spent most of the next five years locked away, two of which were in solitary confinement.[51]

  Dr. Mahathir and Musa, who sat next to each other at weekly Cabinet meetings chaired by the prime minister, were aware of Ghazali's manoeuvrings. Said Musa: "When Hussein Onn says, 'This is from neutral sources', we'd nudge each other and say, 'Special Branch, Special Branch'. That's all. We knew what was going on, yes."[52] Musa said that "if Ghaz had his way, all of us would have been in" detention. It was to Hussein's credit, Musa said, that he had resisted Ghazali's recommendations that Dr. Mahathir and Musa join the others behind bars.

  It was not for want of trying on Ghazali's part, though. Syed Husin Ali, a political prisoner for 19 months at a camp at Taiping in Perak state, was suddenly transferred without explanation to Kuala Lumpur in mid-1976 at the height of the anti-communist hysteria. An associate professor of anthropology and sociology at the University of Malaya, he had been detained since late 1974 for supporting protests by farmers at Baling in Kedah. Held at an unknown location in the capital, he was questioned, threatened, cursed, slapped, punched, kicked and deprived of sleep around the clock for nearly three days and nights, with only brief breaks, by teams of Special Branch officers who focused on his socialist leanings and possible communist links. One officer spat on his face repeatedly. Then, when his head ached and he was at his most vulnerable, a fresh interrogator switched subjects. "Syed," he said. "We know that you have connections with the underground. We know that you were the intermediary between underground elements with Dr. Mahathir and Musa Hitam. You must tell us about this."[53]