Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Read online

  Subsequent research would show Dr. Mahathir was right. The constitutional bias in favour of the Malays simply was not working in practice. Soon after Malaya obtained independence, the average annual income for an adult male was calculated at RM3,223 for Chinese, RM2,013 for Indians and RMl,463 for Malays.[9] Many assessments showed that the Malay share of national wealth declined over the next ten to 15 years.

  While government spending was supposed to have been heavily skewed in favour of the countryside where 70 per cent of Malays toiled as rice farmers, fishermen and rubber small-holders, it was insufficient, or not guided by the appropriate policies, to promote meaningful change. Malay rural life, in fact, was stagnating, with farmers missing out on the growth being achieved by the overall economy. While the provision of roads, irrigation, electrification and technical advice helped, such infrastructure could not overcome institutional constraints such as landlessness, lack of reasonable credit and marketing monopolies.[10]

  Looking back, political scientist John Funston found that the reason for the lack of Malay progress was that UMNO did not have control of the political system, despite what was almost universally believed. While UMNO fielded most candidates in elections and had a decisive majority of Cabinet slots, it was the Chinese partner, the Malaysian Chinese Association, that provided most of the Alliance funds and held the two key portfolios, Finance, and Commerce and Industry. And while it was true that power was concentrated in the hands of Tunku Abdul Rahman, he was no typical Malay and did not always represent their interests. In many ways, the Anglicized, mahjong-playing, horse race-loving Tunku had more in common with the leaders of the Alliance partner parties than with the rank and file of UMNO.[11]

  Presciently, in a newspaper article published in 1968, Dr. Mahathir foresaw a "pent-up reservoir of ill-feelings", with the potential for violence, behind the seemingly "harmonious relationship between the races". Noting that racial intolerance leading to riots had occurred in the United States, Britain, Africa and neighbouring Asian countries, he said preventive measures were needed to avoid it happening in Malaysia. He was in touch with people on the ground, and "I know that the signs and symptoms are already there." Having given a similar warning in an article the previous month, Dr. Mahathir concluded, "If I may say so again, soon it may be too late."[12]

  Just over a year later, on 13 May 1969, Dr. Mahathir's grim prediction came true. Three days after a general election result upset the precarious balance of hope and fear, following a campaign that aroused communal passions, Malays and Chinese indulged in an orgy of killing, looting and burning in Kuala Lumpur. Although the Alliance government retained a majority in Parliament, UMNO lost 8 of its 59 seats, one of them Dr. Mahathir's. The opposition won 14 urban seats, 13 of them at the expense of the Malaysian Chinese Association. Critically, the opposition captured half of the seats in the Selangor State Assembly, raising the possibility that a Malay state that included the nation's capital would pass into Chinese hands.

  Chinese and Indian opposition supporters paraded through the streets of Kuala Lumpur in celebration, taunting and insulting the Malays. Fearful that they were losing their last refuge, political dominance, the Malays retaliated. They slaughtered each other with an assortment of parangs, a type of machette with a wooden handle, knives, daggers, iron bars and other improvised weapons, while torching cars and buildings. By the time the army moved in and restored order, terrified Chinese and Malays were huddled behind makeshift barricades in a maze of fortified enclaves patrolled by armed vigilantes. The official toll was put at 196 dead and 439 wounded. Unofficial estimates ran much higher. "May 13" was seared in the young nation's soul: a date, a bloodbath, a tragedy.

  The following day, the king proclaimed a State of Emergency, suspended Parliament and a National Operations Council took over, a serious setback for the fledgling democracy. It effectively marked the end of Tunku Abdul Rahman's reign, though he did not formally retire as prime minister until September 1970. Deputy Premier Razak, who was also defence minister and minister for home affairs, slipped easily into the chairmanship of the council, which governed by decree for the next 21 months.

  In UMNO, young Malay nationalists associated with Dr. Mahathir, including Musa Hitam, an assistant minister, and Abdullah Ahmad, political secretary to Razak, reached a rough consensus on the electoral results. They felt the "social contract" had failed, that UMNO had conceded too much to the Chinese, and the country must be "returned" to the Malays. They held Tunku Abdul Rahman responsible and felt he should quit, but Ismail Abdul Rahman, recruited as home affairs minister by Razak, told a four-man delegation, which included Dr. Mahathir, that he would not tolerate any attempt to depose the Tunku. At the same time, though, Ismail said to give him and Razak a year, and if they failed to "arrange things" with the Tunku, they would openly back a putsch against him.[13] The anti-Tunku agitators were supposed to be patient.

  Dr. Mahathir had other ideas. He sat down in Alor Star on 17 June and hammered out the most notorious letter in Malaysian politics. This was no surat layang, flying letter, an anonymous poisoned message designed to discredit an opponent, which is a common tactic. He addressed his missive to Tunku Abdul Rahman, and signed it. Having been reprimanded by the Tunku for commenting publicly on the delicate political situation, Dr. Mahathir sent a letter in Malay that political scientist Karl von Vorys called noteworthy not only because it was deliberately offensive but also because it represented the mood of many Malays.[14]

  In it, Dr. Mahathir said Tunku Abdul Rahman's pro-Chinese policies were directly responsible for the "May 13" riots. Malays, whether UMNO or the opposition Persatuan Islam Sa Tanah Melayu (PAS), "really hate you...," he said. "I wish to convey what the community really thinks, which is that it is high time you resigned as prime minister and head of UMNO." Dr. Mahathir said he felt the responsibility to speak up, even if it meant he might be jailed. He accused the Tunku of continuing to play poker "with your Chinese friends" during the emergency, using police vehicles and escorts to find players.

  On a sensitive, personal note, Dr. Mahathir wrote that he had heard that the Tunku had called him "Pakistani" — an allusion to his South Indian forebears — but he did not believe it. This was because Dr. Mahathir had always defended the Tunku when PAS called him "the son of Siam" — a reference to his Thai mother — which implied he was unfit to be the leader of the Malays. So, Dr. Mahathir said, he expected that the Tunku would have defended him, despite his having "two spoonfuls of Pakistani blood in my body".

  Having withdrawn earlier at the merest hint of a brush with Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dr. Mahathir chose the extreme opposite tack this time: frontal assault. It was all or nothing again. And it was hugely risky for anyone hoping to climb the political ladder, though it was almost certainly carefully calculated. As would become clearer later, Dr. Mahathir rarely, if ever, made a political move without weighing the likely consequences. More than most, he realized how deeply unpopular the Tunku had become among Malays.

  The Tunku was doubly furious to find that Dr. Mahathir's letter was being read throughout the country. While student sympathizers passed on copies, the letter was systematically distributed by a group that included Razak's aide, Abdullah Ahmad. Members chipped in a total of RM1,500 to cover ink, envelopes and postage, copied the letter and mailed it to everyone on UMNO, universities and civil service invitation lists that they obtained.[15]

  How and when the letter left Dr. Mahathir's hands remained disputed. "He gave it to the right people," said Abdullah, who maintained that he saw a copy before Dr. Mahathir sent it to Tunku Abdul Rahman. Abdullah said he showed the letter to Razak, who said, "I've read it. We've discussed it, but please understand that I haven't seen this letter."[16] Dr. Mahathir, however, denied circulating the letter in advance to anyone. "Later on, I gave copies to friends" as a "kind of insurance. If anything happens to me they will know I have done this".[17]

  The one person Dr. Mahathir might have informed, considering he was jeopardizing his poli
tical career, was Dr. Siti Hasmah. But he told his wife nothing — "I was shocked," she said — establishing a pattern of behaviour that he was to observe throughout his political life.[18] Involved in some of the most tumultuous events in the nation's history, Dr. Mahathir declined to discuss them as they unfolded with his family. Returning home in the evening after upheavals in the government or party, he would usually remain tight-lipped. Like other Malaysians, his wife and children learned what happened from newspaper and TV reports. "We would never know about it, even if he had a big day," said Mukhriz Mahathir.[19]

  Tunku Abdul Rahman's response to Dr. Mahathir was an ultimatum: Resign or be expelled from the party. Sensing high-level sympathy for Dr. Mahathir, even with the deputy prime minister, the Tunku also issued an ultimatum to Razak: It was either him or Mahathir.[20] With Razak presiding, Dr. Mahathir was evicted on 12 July 1969 from UMNO's Supreme Council, to which he had been elected on an annual basis since 1965. Aware of what the verdict would be, Dr. Mahathir still refused to apologize or back down when addressing fellow council members. The charge was breach of party discipline, that he had widely circulated correspondence containing "vitally important party matters" that should have been first discussed by the Supreme Council. He insisted then, as he would subsequently, that he had not abetted its dissemination. On 26 September, Dr. Mahathir was kicked out of the party altogether. Musa Hitam, one of his staunchest allies in the anti-Tunku campaign, was forced to resign as assistant minister to the deputy prime minister.

  With Musa heading abroad to study and Dr. Mahathir beating a retreat to Kedah to resume full-time practice as a doctor, the crisis in UMNO was over, and Tunku Abdul Rahman appeared to have prevailed. But it was something of a last gasp for the Tunku. Students at institutions of higher learning were agitating for his removal, making it necessary for the National Operations Council to ban "any meeting, procession, demonstration or public utterance to get Tunku Abdul Rahman to step down from office". Dr. Mahathir's letter was also formally banned, with printing, selling or distributing it punishable by three years imprisonment and a fine of RM2,000. With this sort of protection, no outsiders could force the Tunku to quit, though just as surely he would no longer have the final say on matters of substance. New policies were on the way to ensure Malay political dominance, and the Tunku would be carried along with the tide, before being eased out.

  Dr. Mahathir blamed Chinese voters for the surprising loss of his seat. Friends said he courted defeat with a loose comment in advance that he could win if all the Malays, who constituted 80 to 90 per cent of the Kota Star South constituency, voted for him. His remark was interpreted in a Chinese newspaper as an insult to mean he did not need Chinese support, and Chinese voters responded by deserting him in favour of his PAS opponent.[21] Dr. Mahathir agreed that the Chinese — who held what he called "the casting vote" since the Malays were fairly evenly split — had switched allegiance. But he said it was because "they thought I was a Malay ultra", the label given to him by Singapore. Defying national trends, "because I was known as a champion of the Malays," his Malay vote actually increased, he said.[22]

  With the police still investigating his letter, Dr. Mahathir feared arrest. He learned from police friends that Tunku Abdul Rahman wanted to detain him, but they persuaded the Tunku it would only make a martyr of Dr. Mahathir.[23] Too late: He was already a hero in Malay eyes. The rapid sequence of shattering events — a traumatic election campaign, his defeat, the "May 13" violence, the Tunku letter, double expulsion — gave him an almost cult-like following in his community. As political scientist Khoo Boo Teik said, "It transformed him from being a failed electoral candidate into a living symbol of Malay nationalism."[24]

  At no stage during his almost three years in the political wilderness did Dr. Mahathir lose interest in shaping the debate on Malaysia's future. In addition to running his clinic and investing, he stepped up his writing. In early 1970, he published his best known book, The Malay Dilemma,[25] which was promptly banned in Malaysia, remaining proscribed until he became prime minister in 1981. The ban added to Dr. Mahathir's maverick image without the contents of the book remaining secret, since it was available in Singapore and he accepted speaking invitations and discussed the substance of it. Two other publications that appeared a few years later were substantially written during this period. Panduan Peniaga Kecil, published in 1974, appeared in English in 1985 as Guide for Small Businessmen. It advised Malays how to get started in business and, in particular, how to succeed against Chinese competition.[26] The 14 essays published as Menghadapi Cabaran in 1976, and issued in 1986 as The Challenge, was a reflective work that emphasized the importance of spiritual values, education, discipline and organization. It was critical of corruption, destructive opposition to governments from pressure groups and allegedly decadent Western ways — resistance to hard work, untidiness, nudity and homosexuality.[27]

  Contentiously, The Malay Dilemma argued that the Malays were the original or indigenous people of Malaya, and should be accepted as the "definitive race". It rejected non-Malay claims to political, linguistic and cultural parity with the Malays, but not on the grounds that the Malays were superior in any way. Just as countries such as the United States and Australia required a certain minimal assimilation of migrants to their own national culture, the Malays had a right to expect the non-Malays to do the same. The aim was "not designed to perpetuate the privileges of the original definitive race to the exclusion of the new immigrant races...settlers willing to conform to the characteristics of the definitive citizen will in fact become definitive citizens and will exercise the same rights and privileges". In practice, they would need to speak Malay and be educated in Malay, though they would not be required to adopt Islam.

  The book defined its title: "The Malay dilemma is whether they should stop trying to help themselves in order that they should be proud to be the poor citizens of a prosperous country or whether they should try to get at some of the riches that this country boasts of, even if it blurs the economic picture of Malaysia a little." The answer was never in doubt: "The cup of Malay bitterness must be diluted. A solution must be found, an equitable solution which denies nothing to anyone and yet gives the Malay his place in the Malayan sun."

  Dr. Mahathir's proffered solution was "constructive protection", a vague term implying a level of support somewhere in between leaving the Malays defenceless in the face of Chinese aggression and making their lives so comfortable that they would forget how to compete and progress. His concern about over-protecting the Malays was due to his belief in the then popular, later discredited, notion known as Social Darwinism to explain their inferiority and Chinese superiority. While he never used the term, Dr. Mahathir, like Social Darwinism's other adherents, applied the phrase "survival of the fittest" — first coined by the British economist, Herbert Spencer, after Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory of "natural selection" — to the competition for survival in human society. Dr. Mahathir even embraced the eugenics offshoot idea, that the unfit transmit their undesirable characteristics.

  The book surmised that the early Malays, inhabiting a lush land with plenty of food, did not suffer starvation and even the weak in mind and body were able to survive and procreate. The hot, humid climate was not conducive to either vigorous work or mental activity, so they were content to spend most of their time resting or talking to each other. In-breeding, and the absence of inter-racial marriages in rural areas, together with certain social practices, sapped their enterprise and had a disastrous effect on the Malay community over the long term. The Chinese, by contrast, from a homeland littered with disasters and with a custom of "cross-breeding", were the fit survivors of a natural weeding out process.

  If all protection for the Malays were removed, the book argued, "it would perhaps be possible to breed a hardy and resourceful race capable of competing against all corners. Unfortunately, we do not have four thousand years to play around with." So while Dr. Mahathir accepted the need for constructive prot
ection immediately, in the end it would be "the people alone who make themselves equal". In other words, he concluded that the ultimate solution to Malay inequality was to remake the Malays, changing some of their "inherent traits and character acquired over the centuries", including their "fatalism", and "failure to value time" and "appreciate the real value of money and property". It was a task that would absorb much of his energy in the years ahead.[28]

  From the political sidelines, Dr. Mahathir could watch with satisfaction as his like-minded allies in UMNO came to exercise decisive influence over party policies. The trend, which could easily have been following a Mahathir script, was to put Malay political predominance, whose reality was questioned in the election result, beyond dispute. By the time Parliament reopened in early 1971, Razak had succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as prime minister and Malaysia's Constitution and the Sedition Act were amended to make it illegal to question "sensitive issues": citizenship, the special position of the Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak, the national language and the status of the sultans. Not even elected members of parliament could question them.

  The Razak government's major response to the May 13 riots was a far-reaching affirmative action programme called the New Economic Policy (NEP), to last for 20 years from its introduction in 1971. Just as Dr. Mahathir advised, it pinpointed Malay deprivation as the underlying cause of the unrest and set national unity as the long-term goal. The two main objectives of the NEP were the eradication of poverty for all Malaysians, and the restructuring of society so that race was no longer identified with economic function. As no ethnic group was to feel a sense of deprivation and the Malays had to make significant gains, the NEP was predicated on strong and sustained overall economic growth.