Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Page 45
Ibid.
Raphael Pura, "Anwar Deftly Navigates Shoals of Malaysian Crisis", Asian Wall Street Journal, 18 September 1997.
Ibid.
John Funston, "Political Careers of Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim: Parallel, Intersecting and Conflicting Lives".
Ibid.
Interview with Siti Hasmah Mohamad Ali, 17 January 2008.
A. Kadir Jasin, "Anwar's Loyalty to Dr. M Not in Doubt", New Sunday Times, 15 October 1995.
In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State Under Mahathir (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 283.
V.G. Kulkarni, Murray Hiebert and S. Jayasankaran, "Tough Talk: Premier Mahathir Thrives on No-nonsense Policies", Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 October 1996, p. 23.
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003), p. 33.
John Funston, "A Fateful September", Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, p. 169.
In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State Under Mahathir, p. 289.
"Too Absurd to be Believed", New Straits Times, 25 August 1997, cited in Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and Its Discontents (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2003), p. 78.
Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and Its Discontents, p. 78.
Interview with Musa Hitam, 1 April 2008.
Raphael Pura, "Anwar Deftly Navigates Shoals of Malaysian Crisis".
Ibid.
John Funston, "A Fateful September", p. 168.
Anwar Ibrahim, "From the Halls of Power to the Labyrinth of Incarceration", a letter from Sungai Buloh Prison, 3 November 1998, p. 7.
In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State Under Mahathir, p. 293.
Interview with Musa Hitam, 1 April 2008.
In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State Under Mahathir, p. 296.
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk, p. 41.
John Funston, "A Fateful September", p. 166.
Straits Times, 30 June 1998, cited in "A Fateful September", p. 167.
John Funston, "A Fateful September", p. 166.
"Malaysia: The Feud", Business Week, 9 November 1998, http://www.businessweek.com/1998/45/b3603032.htm (accessed 13 April 2009).
In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics, p. 298.
"Anwar Backs Zahid's Call on Contests for Top Posts", Star, 11 May 1998, cited in Personalized Politics, p. 300, fn 80.
"'I Never Threatened the PM'", Asiaweek, 18 September 1998, p. 50.
Anwar Ibrahim, "From the Halls of Power to the Labyrinth of Incarceration", p. 8.
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk, p. 65.
In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State Under Mahathir, p. 301.
Ibid., pp. 301-302.
Anwar Ibrahim, "From the Halls of Power to the Labyrinth of Incarceration", p. 8.
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk, p. 66.
John Funston, "A Fateful September", p. 170.
Anwar Ibrahim, "From the Halls of Power to the Labyrinth of Incarceration", pp. 9-10.
"Mahathir Discusses Malaysia's Economic Crisis", Time Asia Magazine: Malaysia Archives, originally published 15 June 1998, http://time.com/asia/2003/mahathir/mahathir980615_intvu.html (accessed 1 November 2006).
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk, p. 77.
Anwar Ibrahim, "From the Halls of Power to the Labyrinth of Incarceration", p. 11.
"Affidavit — Anwar Sodomised Man 15 Times", Malay Mail, 3 September 1998, http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx (accessed 31 March 2008).
"Affidavits Accepted by High Court", Malay Mail, 4 September 1998, http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx (accessed 31 March 2008).
Anwar Ibrahim, "From the Halls of Power to the Labyrinth of Incarceration", p. 14.
Ibid., p. 14. A tape recording and transcript of the Supreme Council meeting, which were widely circulated, showed a small number speaking in support of Anwar. Email correspondence with John Funston, 6 April 2009.
In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State Under Mahathir, p. 305.
Ibid., p. 307.
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk, p. 105.
Statutory Declaration by Dr. Munawar Ahmad Anees, parts 1, 2 and 3, published 3 December 1998, http://www.c20.org/malaysia/democracy/reports/981203_stat_dec_munawar_01.htm (accessed 19 February 2008).
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk, p. 106.
Satwant Singh and Sujatani Poosparajah, "We were Sodomised", New Straits Times, 20 September 1998.
Ibid.
"FAC News Unveils What the Royal Commission Uncovered", 4 March 2002, http://www.freeanwar.net/jan2002/facnews040302.htm (accessed 12 April 2009).
John Funston, "The Legacy of Dr. Mahathir", Australian Financial Review, 30 July 2004.
Rehman Rashid, "The Politics of Contempt", 17 December 1998, http://members.tripod.com/Anwarite/rehman.htm (accessed 3 March 2008).
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk, p. 114.
Statutory Declaration by Dr. Munawar Ahmad Anees, part 3.
"Justice in Jeopardy: Malaysia 2000", a report on behalf of the International Bar Association, the ICJ Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the Commonwealth Lawyers Association and the Union Internationale des Advocats, pp. 60, 77.
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk, p. 132.
"Justice in Jeopardy: Malaysia 2000", p. 59.
Ibid., p. 48.
Resolution adopted unanimously by the IPU Governing Council at its 174th Session (Mexico City, 23 April 2004), cited in "Anwar Ibrahim's Long Struggle for Justice", a "Report on Datuk Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim's Appeal against Conviction Observed on Behalf of the Australian Bar Association and International Commission of Jurists", by Mark Trowell, QC, INSAF, Journal of the Malaysian Bar (2005) XXXIV no. 1, p. 37.
"Justice in Jeopardy: Malaysia 2000", pp. 44-45.
Dalilah Ibrahim and Chelsea L.Y. Ng, "'I WAS A SEX SLAVE'", Star, 3 December 1998.
Shamsul A.B. and Wendy A. Smith, "Serious Issues, Popular Desire: Paradoxes of Mahathir's Morality", in Bridget Welsh, ed., Reflections: The Mahathir Years (Washington: Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2004), pp. 43-44.
Rehman Rashid, "The Politics of Contempt".
"Justice in Jeopardy: Malaysia 2000", pp. 45-46.
Ibid., p. 46.
Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk, pp. 167-168.
"Anwar Ibrahim's Long Struggle for Justice", p. 27.
"The Anwar Appeal", press release by Param Cumaraswamy, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 22 April 2003, cited in "Anwar Ibrahim's Long Struggle for Justice", p. 30.
Letter to Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim, Chief Justice, from Param Cumaraswamy, dated 20 June 2003.
"Anwar Ibrahim's Long Struggle for Justice", p. 64, fn 1.
Anwar Ibrahim's 21 August 2003 press statement, cited in "Anwar Ibrahim's Long Struggle for Justice", pp. 29-30.
"The Anwar Appeal", cited in "Anwar Ibrahim's Long Struggle for Justice", p. 31.
"Anwar Ibrahim's Long Struggle for Justice", p. 19.
"Justice in Jeopardy: Malaysia 2000", p. 77.
Param Cumaraswamy, Vice-President, International Commission of Jurists, quoted in 3 September 2004 press release, "Malaysia: ICJ Welcomes Ruling in Anwar Appeal".
"Anwar Ibrahim's Long Struggle for Justice", p. 20.
Leslie Lopez, "Malaysian Court Reverses Anwar Sodomy Conviction", Asian Wall Street Journal, 3 September 2004.
"Thinking Allowed: No Deal Between Pak Lah and Anwar", Aliran Monthly, 2004: 8, http://www.aliran.com/monthly/2004/8i.html (acces
sed 26 January 2006).
Transcript of Anwar Ibrahim trial before Judge Ariffin Jaka, 12 June 2000, pp. 2034-2040.
"Abuse of Power Over Corruption Probe: No", Straits Times, 9 April 2008.
Interview with Param Cumaraswamy, 16 January 2008.
* * *
Part III
Turmoil in Retirement
* * *
(12)
A Bare-Knuckle Brawl Over One Man's Legacy
When he retired on 31 October 2003, Dr. Mahathir said he was finished with politics. He declined an offer to remain in the Cabinet as a "senior minister",[1] an arrangement pioneered by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew that enabled him to keep tabs on his successors. Dr. Mahathir had begun writing his memoirs while he served out his 16-month notice,[2] and looked forward to finishing them and accepting invitations from abroad that work commitments had hitherto precluded. He promised not to interfere in Malaysian government affairs. "No, I have already made it very clear that when I leave, I leave completely," he said.[3]
Dr. Mahathir had chosen carefully as his successor Abdullah Badawi, an experienced, modest and affable veteran, over the younger, better educated and more vigorous Najib Razak. Abdullah, 63, was familiar with Dr. Mahathir's thinking, having served in most of his cabinets in such senior portfolios as education, defence and foreign affairs. Najib, 50, a bit on the young side, Dr. Mahathir reasoned, could step in after Abdullah had served a single term.[4] Abdullah's only blemish was that he had backed Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah in challenging Dr. Mahathir for the leadership of UMNO in 1987. But Abdullah had not joined Tengku Razaleigh's breakaway faction, and Dr. Mahathir had forgiven him and restored his ministerial rank after three years and nine months on the backbenches. Before taking over, Abdullah envisaged no major policy shifts. He said, "My vision for Malaysia is Vision 2020," which was Dr. Mahathir's blueprint and target to join the First World.
Privately, however, Dr. Mahathir had second thoughts about Abdullah, who declined to give a commitment in advance to name Najib as his deputy, for the fairly obvious reason that Najib was his strongest rival in the party. In response to a letter from Dr. Mahathir, Abdullah said he could not decide until he became prime minister.[5] Dr. Mahathir discussed his misgivings with a confidant, former finance minister Daim Zainuddin, who suggested it was still not too late to hand the reins to Najib instead. But Dr. Mahathir worried that the public would condemn him if, at the eleventh hour, he ditched his fourth deputy. "I've already had three deputy prime ministers," he told Daim. "If I do it again, people might say it's me, not my deputy," who is the problem.[6]
As Abdullah prepared to take office, he appointed trusted aides to run Bernama, the national news agency, and TV3, the country's biggest private television station. Three weeks into the job he sacked the editor-in-chief of the New Straits Times publishing group, Abdullah Ahmad, ostensibly for writing a commentary that offended a foreign government. In fact, Abdullah Ahmad was replaced because he was a Mahathir ally who was pressuring the new prime minister in print to confirm Najib. "Don't tie my hands," an irritated premier told Abdullah Ahmad. "I want a free choice."[7] Dr. Mahathir and Abdullah Ahmad feared his choice would be Muhyiddin Yassin, another UMNO vice president, who was close to the prime minister.[8] After two long months as prime minister, during which Malaysia had no leadership succession in place, Abdullah made Najib deputy UMNO president and deputy premier.
While that was the outcome Dr. Mahathir sought, he had just about lost faith in Abdullah. Subsequent events convinced him that he had made an horrendous mistake, and that it was incumbent upon him to force Abdullah to mend his ways or step aside.
Abdullah was known affectionately as Pak Lah — Uncle Abdullah, with his name shortened to the final syllable — a moniker that summed him up neatly: He was mild, moderate and, with the habits of a former civil servant, steeply inclined towards consultation and consensus. The contrast was striking with the energetic and confident Dr. Mahathir, who made decisions faster than he consulted his cabinet colleagues, and found targets of scorn and derision almost daily.
Ironically, it was Abdullah's need to prove himself — after all, he had been installed in the top job, unchallenged, by just one man — that provided the first systematic critique of Dr. Mahathir's record. Abdullah's agenda, which he gradually warmed to under the influence of a small coterie of unofficial advisers, had the effect of reviewing Dr. Mahathir's performance in a way that was beyond contemplation when he still held office. As some of the dark side of Malaysia's hard charge to modernity was exposed, Dr. Mahathir joined the debate, confrontational as ever, and it became nothing less than a bare-knuckle brawl over his legacy.
The appointment of Abdullah loyalists to key media posts assumed added significance as the drama unfolded and the two fought a political battle that kept the country variously enthralled, amused and appalled for the next three years. Devoting his "retirement" to undermining Abdullah's administration, Dr. Mahathir wrote another chapter in his extraordinary political career. It was bizarre at times, as he criticized policies and attacked ministers who, until recently, had been long-time cabinet colleagues and faithful followers. Forced to take sides, they protected their positions and observed Malay feudal tradition by lining up, to a person, behind their current leader, Abdullah. Finally, though, Abdullah was undone largely by his own incompetence and fading electoral appeal. In an effort to keep the heat on him, Dr. Mahathir quit UMNO in protest in 2008, only to rejoin in triumph in 2009 after helping force Abdullah into retirement early in his second term.
The subdued Abdullah won favour early for merely being himself and lowering the volume of politics. He took a conscious decision to limit his exposure to the media and not seek the saturation coverage that had become standard for the leader.[9] What would normally be an obstacle to leadership, his lack of sparkle, actually was an asset in the circumstances. After being lectured, hectored and admonished for so long, Malaysians relished a well-earned respite. Pak Lah's arrival helped engender a mood of relief, even elation, over the promise of a fresh start.
Yet once Abdullah settled comfortably in the prime minister's seat, he felt it necessary to emerge from Dr. Mahathir's shadow. Malaysians were gratified that the transition, the fourth since independence in 1957, had gone smoothly, once more confirming the essential and enviable stability of the political system. But they wanted to know if the pre-selected Abdullah was his own man. When he spoke, was it his, or his master's voice, they heard? The distinction was more than academic, for large numbers of them looked to the newcomer for change, despite the accolades that echoed for Dr. Mahathir.
Writer and journalist Rehman Rashid observed that the style of governance was giving way from magisterial to managerial in a Malaysia assembled on a build-operate-transfer basis: "Dr. Mahathir built it, and now he is handing it over to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to operate, and eventually transfer to his own successor."[10] The belief that Abdullah would do little more than push buttons in the Mahathir machine was almost inevitable, considering that he had rarely expressed views that set him apart from Dr. Mahathir, and he no doubt had been chosen in part to protect his former boss's reputation and interests.
Clearly, Prime Minister Abdullah lacked legitimacy. He needed to step out and allow himself to be judged not only by his political party but also by the people of Malaysia, to gain the moral authority to match his political rank. Constitutionally, a general election had to be held by November 2004, while UMNO would hold its annual meeting, to include the triennial election of office bearers, in the second half of 2004. Abdullah set his sights on those two events, one tightly linked to the other, determined to acquire the sort of mandate that permitted nobody to doubt that he was governing in his own right, and as more than an interim or accidental premier.
There was no point in Abdullah trying to fill Dr. Mahathir's outsized shoes with bigger and better dreams for Malaysia. Nor did it make sense, at the other extreme, to present himself as a pale imitation of the larger-than-life figure he
replaced. Abdullah settled for a measured approach that fit his personality and sought to reassess, renovate and, where necessary, reform Dr. Mahathir's Malaysia. While talking continuity, Abdullah's administration embarked on a process predicted by political scientist Khoo Boo Teik and characterized by him as de-Mahathirization — "suitably timed, carefully calibrated and delicately performed measures to distinguish itself from the old regime".[11]
While the measures were delicate enough at first, before long they took on a life of their own. And, given the sensitive nature of some, no time would have been suitable to introduce them if it meant avoiding embarrassment and bruised egos.
Abdullah began to stake out his own space by declaring war on corruption and inefficiency in government departments. It was a logical place to start, and not just because the cheer-leading media were promoting him as Mr. Nice and Mr. Clean. The Malaysia he inherited was awash with irregular payments, from petty bribery in the bureaucracy to outrageous commissions for defence contracts and multi-million dollar abuses in affirmative action policies. At the apex of this mountain of black cash was UMNO, a "one-stop shop for handouts and favours", as a critic put it.[12]
Shrewdly borrowing from former deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim's Reformasi campaign, Abdullah promised greater transparency and accountability and less red tape at the head of a "clean, incorruptible" administration that was "beyond suspicion". He pledged open tendering for government contracts, which would mean an end to one of the most notorious forms of cronyism. Announcing a national integrity campaign, he allocated RM17 million to establish a regional anti-corruption academy and pledged Malaysia would sign the United Nations Anti-Corruption Convention.
The enthusiastic reception for Abdullah's rhetoric confirmed the public's deep disquiet over Dr. Mahathir's failure to check the spread of corruption in its myriad and multiplying forms. Although he was never suspected of plundering the economy for personal gain along the lines of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Dr. Mahathir could not escape responsibility for an entrenched culture of greed and graft. As a strong leader, he had set the tone as well as the standard of behaviour in his regime. For, as he once observed, "If a society does not want corruption, it should not create a climate so conducive to corruption."[13]