Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Page 32

  Ibid.

  Barry Wain, "Trying to Limit the Role of Malay Hereditary Rulers", Asian Wall Street Journal, 5 September 1983.

  K. Das, "Less Ado About Anything: Mahathir Moves Quietly to Reduce the Constitutional Role the Sultans Play in the Nation's Legislative Process".

  Raphael Pura, "Malaysia Deadlocked by Royalty Crisis".

  Raphael Pura, "Gun-Toting Sultans Arrive in Style at Royal Palace in Selangor State", Asian Wall Street Journal, 21 November 1983.

  Raphael Pura, "Mahathir Whips Up Support at Rallies", Asian Wall Street Journal, 12 December 1983.

  Raphael Pura, "Mahathir Won't Retreat from His Battle Royal", Asian Wall Street Journal, 5 December 1983.

  Interview with Siti Hasmah Mohamad Ali, 17 January 2008.

  Andrew Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia, p. 71.

  Raphael Pura, "Malaysian Rulers Compromise on Veto", Asian Wall Street Journal, 16 December 1983.

  R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 37.

  Michael Vatikiotis, "A Code for the Royals: UMNO Seeks a Deal on Role of Hereditary Rulers", Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1992, http://www.feer.com/articles/archive/1992/9203_12/P013.html (accessed 23 January 2006).

  Cheong Mei Sui and Adibah Amin, Daim: The Man Behind the Enigma (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1995), p. 127.

  Roger Kershaw, Monarchy in South-East Asia, p. 109.

  Andrew Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia, p. 77.

  Stephen Duthie, "Alleged Beating Puts Sultans of Malaysia in Firing Line", Asian Wall Street Journal, 10 December 1992.

  Roger Kershaw, Monarchy in South-East Asia, p. 110.

  Stephen Duthie, "Alleged Beating Puts Sultans of Malaysia in Firing Line".

  Stephen Duthie, "Malaysia Sultan is Censured by Parliament", Asian Wall Street Journal, 11 December 1992.

  "A Just King is Adulated, but an Unjust King is to be Shunned", speech by Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba in the House of Representatives, 10 December 1992, The Other Side of Mahathir, Appendix 2, p. 294.

  Stephen Duthie, "Malaysian Royalty Faces Limit to Powers", Asian Wall Street Journal, 13 January 1993.

  Stephen Duthie, "Malaysia Nears Crisis as Sultans Reject Curbs", Asian Wall Street Journal, 19 January 1993.

  Ibid.

  Stephen Duthie, "Malaysian Government is Unlikely to Put End to Clash with Royalty", Asian Wall Street Journal, 10 March 1993.

  Stephen Duthie, "Malaysian Royalty Faces Limit to Powers".

  Stephen Duthie, "Malaysia Sultan is Censured by Parliament".

  Stephen Duthie, "Mahathir is Likely Victor in 2nd Round with Royalty", Asian Wall Street Journal, 14 December 1992.

  Ibid.

  Stephen Duthie, "Royalty's Pampered History Returns to Haunt Malaysia", Asian Wall Street Journal, 5 February 1993.

  Stephen Duthie, "Malaysia to Cut Outlays for Royalty's Expenses", Asian Wall Street Journal, 27 January 1993.

  Stephen Duthie, "Royalty's Pampered History Returns to Haunt Malaysia".

  Stephen Duthie, "Malaysia to Cut Outlays for Royalty's Expenses".

  Stephen Duthie, "Royal Rights Compromise Backed by Malaysia's King", Asian Wall Street Journal, 19 February 1993.

  Kua Kia Soong, ed., K. Das & the Tunku Tapes (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Info Research Development, 2002), pp. 128, 131, 132.

  Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, p. 11.

  Email correspondence with Param Cumaraswamy, 14 May 2008.

  Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the Asean Law Association General Assembly, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 26 October 1982.

  Interview with Chandra Muzaffar, 16 August 2007.

  Chow Kum Hor, "Rulers Get Their Way in Choice of MBs", Straits Times, 28 March 2008. Malaysia's king, Sultan Mizan Zainal Abidin of Trengganu, not only refused to appoint Abdullah's candidate as chief minister of the state, but also led a campaign by the Conference of Rulers to refuse to accept the government's nominees for two top judicial appointments. Leslie Lopez, "Malaysian Royals Start to Flex Their Muscles", Straits Times, 28 July 2008.

  Roger Kershaw, Monarchy in South-East Asia, p. 117.

  H.P. Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 119.

  * * *

  (9)

  The Perils of a Pragmatic Islam

  For Dr. Mahathir, Islam was more than a personal creed. It was a tool to help uplift the Malays and pursue his dreams of a fully developed Malaysia.[1] The problem, as he saw it, was that Islam-dominated Malay culture was an obstacle to their advancement. It was not so much the religion itself, he believed, but the local interpretation of Islamic doctrines that caused the trouble. So he defined for Malaysian Muslims an interpretation of Islam that was meant not only to take care of their spiritual well-being, but to secure material benefits for them as well.

  Quick to recognize the significance of a global Islamic resurgence, Dr. Mahathir harnessed it to legitimize his administration and make Islam an integral element of his commitment to an increased Malay stake in the economy. Establishing Islamic institutions, such as a university, a bank and various business bodies, he promoted economic development and prosperity as compatible with the ethics, theology and philosophy of Islam.[2] He went further, asserting that it was incumbent upon Muslims to embrace modernity and economic progress to overcome their backwardness and recover Islam's past glory. Dr. Mahathir's pragmatic strategy won him a glowing reputation throughout the Islamic world, but he stumbled badly as he succumbed to political expediency in the final years of his leadership of Malaysia.

  By equating Islam with ethnicity in pursuit of his grand design, Dr. Mahathir ensured that religion became an even more vital part of Malay identity, which led to significant numbers of Malay Muslims questioning many aspects of Malaysian society. Holding their leaders to Islam's strict ethical standards, these Malays were alienated by the rampant corruption and cronyism spawned by Dr. Mahathir's economic vision, centred on the government's affirmative action programme. Dr. Mahathir's abrupt dismissal and vilification of his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998 stripped the administration of much of its remaining moral authority in the eyes of Malays, leaving the prime minister exposed and vulnerable to electoral punishment and heavily dependent on non-Malays to remain in office.

  The major beneficiary of Dr. Mahathir's perceived ethical collapse was the opposition Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), the direct ethnic rival of his UMNO. Ironically, it was PAS, which always wanted Malaysia turned into an Islamic state, that Dr. Mahathir had tried to undercut by adopting moderate Islamization policies back in the early 1980s. With disillusioned, disenchanted and disgusted Malays deserting UMNO in droves in the 1999 general election, however, PAS vaulted from its provincial base to become the formal leader of the opposition in the national Parliament. The measure of PAS's success was the extent of Dr. Mahathir's failure.

  Recast overnight by his critics as an "anti-Muslim villain" and contemptuously labelled Mahazalim, Mahakejam and Mahafiraun[3] — the Great Oppressor, the Cruel One and the Great Pharaoh: in summary, the cruelest of them all — Dr. Mahathir chose not to address the many sources of Malay discontent. Instead, he tried to recover Malay affection by further outbidding PAS on religion, offering some of the items on the fundamentalist agenda he had always opposed.[4] Encouraged and emboldened, religious bureaucrats flexed their muscles and tried to impose a grim form of Islamic orthodoxy. The whole sorry saga culminated in a declaration by Dr. Mahathir in late 2001 that Malaysia was, in fact, already an Islamic state — a day that in local terms is likely to live in infamy.

  It was possible for Dr. Mahathir to make such a controversial claim because the Federation of Malaysia's Constitution is ambiguous on this crucial point. An Islamic state is commonly understood to mean a country where Islamic law, known as sharia, is the supreme law of the land. The alternative is secularism, where the state professes no rel
igion and does not side with any religion. The Malaysian Constitution states that Islam is "the" religion of the nation, though freedom of worship is guaranteed for all. Despite that constitutional guarantee, in practice freedom of religion is qualified. Muslims — all ethnic Malays are automatically registered as Muslims — are answerable to sharia courts, which usually deny them the right to leave Islam or convert to another faith. Indeed, apostasy or conversion is a punishable offence in most states, either with a fine or a jail sentence, or both.

  In a memorandum to the Reid Constitutional Commission, which drafted the Constitution before independence in 1957, the governing Alliance said the country should be secular, with Islam made the official religion.[5] An Islamic state was not one of the commission's terms of reference. A White Paper dealing with the constitutional proposals specified that Islam's status would "in no way affect the present position of the Federation as a secular state".[6] But the language ultimately adopted was thought sufficient to convey that notion without actually mentioning the word "secular".[7] At the same time by designating, in effect, an official religion, Malaysia's Constitution allowed the government to fund certain Islamic activities — building mosques, holding Qur'an-reading competitions and organizing the hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia that every Muslim is expected to make at least once.

  Back in those more relaxed days it was expected that Islam would play a declining role in national affairs. The departing British handed over to an UMNO-led democratic government with a Western-educated leadership that was focused on economic development. Malaysia's Sunni Muslims were easy-going, coexisting peacefully enough with the Chinese and Indian minorities — predominantly Buddhists, Christians and Hindus — who made up half the population.[8] Few Malay women wore head-coverings, the men were clean-shaven and Muslims generally felt comfortable eating their pork-free meals in non-Muslim restaurants and homes.

  Contrary to expectations, however, Islam gradually became more important in the country's politics and the daily lives of Muslims, especially after PAS proved a serious contender for Malay political allegiance. Formed in 1951 by the defection of UMNO's religious department, PAS attracted members with varied interests, including Malay nationalists demanding independence and conservatives from the ranks of the religious elite.[9] PAS captured two states, Kelantan and Trengganu, in the first post-independence general election, held in 1959, surprising UMNO and permanently splitting the Malay community on political lines. Although its fortunes in terms of legislative representation fluctuated over the years, PAS always won between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of the Malay vote.[10]

  With religion falling under the jurisdiction of the states and their sultans, the federal government initially had only a limited involvement in Islamic affairs. In 1968, however, the Council of Rulers, consisting of the sultans of the nine Malay states, formed the Malaysian National Council for Islamic Affairs, chaired by the prime minister with a secretariat in his department. Expanding quickly in the early 1970s, the council became one of the major institutions for formulating policy on Islamic matters. Operating alongside the civil court system, the sharia courts — which deal with marriage, divorce and death and hear cases against Muslims accused of religious offences — were taken over from the states and reorganized on a federal basis in 1998.[11] Still, the individual states retained the exclusive right to enact laws on Islam, giving rise to different versions throughout the country.

  After the 1969 election, which threatened Malay political supremacy and precipitated racial riots, UMNO sought to recoup political losses by polishing its Islamic credentials. In addition to reinforcing affirmative action for the Malays in the form of the New Economic Policy (NEP), UMNO announced a new cultural policy centered on Islam and beefed up the religious bureaucracy in the Prime Minister's Department. When the three-party Alliance was expanded in 1974 into the much larger National Front coalition, it included four former opposition parties, among them PAS.

  As the worldwide tide of Islamic revivalism lapped Malaysian shores in the early 1970s, the government offered other gestures to show its commitment to the religion — introducing the azan, the call to prayer, over state-run radio and TV, publishing Islamic literature and establishing an Islamic Research Centre and an Islamic Missionary Foundation. With its quest to re-establish Islamic values, practices and laws, the resurgence took the form of numerous dakwah missionary, groups. They found fertile ground especially among Malaysia's young, educated, urban middle class. Malay women took to covering their heads with various versions of the veil, some adding an ankle-length, long-sleeved robe that left only the face and hands visible. Many men grew beards and some also wore robes, to emulate the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. They sprinkled their conversation with Arabic terms, regarded as authentically Islamic. Muslims not only avoided pork, specifically prohibited in the Qur'an, but became sensitive to the presence of gelatin in chocolates, cakes and tomato sauce.[12] The more devout were no longer willing to dine with non-Malay friends, or with lax fellow Malays for that matter. They insisted that their food be strictly halal, prepared in accordance with Islamic prescriptions.

  The dakwah groups concentrated not on converting non-Muslims but on creating conditions that allowed Islam a larger role in the personal lives of adherents and in the conduct of public affairs. Rural-born Malays who migrated to the cities under rapid industrialization were prospective members of organizations that could give them a sense of belonging, and where they would renew their commitment to an Islamic way of life. The groups — tolerant and liberal at first, though some became more militant later — looked to Islam for what its teachings could offer as solutions for Malay problems, such as poverty, lack of education and corruption.

  The "intellectual powerhouse" of the resurgence was the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, known by its Malay acronym as ABIM, co-founded by Anwar Ibrahim in 1971 after he graduated with honours in Malay studies from the University of Malaya.[13] A former student leader and fiery political orator, Anwar led non-partisan ABIM through a period of spectacular growth, finishing the decade with a membership of 35,000 in 86 branches. ABIM published its own monthly journal, produced and marketed Islamic books, maintained a library, ran an economic cooperative and organized leadership training courses and Islamic study groups. Ever-ready to back its demands with direct action, ABIM argued that the Malaysian economy benefited only a small group of local and foreign capitalists and was in need of reform. ABIM also spearheaded complaints against Harun Idris, the chief minister of Selangor,[14] which eventually led to his conviction on several corruption charges.

  As a fresh graduate, Anwar declined an invitation to join UMNO as well as offers of plum jobs in order to continue addressing questions of Malay backwardness. He opened a school under ABIM's auspices for Malay-medium dropouts from the government education system, collecting a monthly subsistence salary of RM350, as principal and board chairman, for the next ten years. Arrested in December 1974 after backing mass student demonstrations in support of Malay peasants who were suffering acute economic hardship in Kedah, Anwar spent almost two years in prison. Accused of anti-government activities going back five years, he was never charged with a crime and continued to guide ABIM from detention. On his release, he picked up from where he had left off, sometimes working with the government, more often a thorn in its side.[15]

  A number of other ABIM leaders left in the late 1970s to join PAS, which after four years had broken with UMNO and departed from the National Front, and many expected Anwar to follow. A visit to Iran soon after Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic revolution in 1979 sharpened Anwar's radical image. In 1981, he linked up with non-Malay groups to head a broad public campaign against government amendments to the Societies Act, which were designed to limit the political activities of non-governmental organizations. Then, in March 1982, in the middle of this campaign, Anwar stunned the country by accepting Dr. Mahathir's invitation to join UMNO and contest a parliamentary seat in a general
election two weeks later.[16]

  Dr. Mahathir had long held strong views on Islam, the practice of which he believed should be drastically reformed in Malaysia, and he saw in the charismatic and popular Anwar an agent of change. Islam of the Shafi'i school, introduced to Malaysia by Arab and Indian traders and scholars around the beginning of the fourteenth century, might be moderate and enlightened, but Dr. Mahathir identified it as a cause of Malay failure and a barrier to national development. He touched on the subject in The Malay Dilemma[17] in 1970 and elaborated on it in Menghadapi Cabaran,[18] published in 1976, which appeared later in English as [The Challenge].[19] Dr. Mahathir wrote that the Malays' value system and code of ethics, on which Islam was the single greatest influence, were "impediments to their progress".[20] He blamed "Malay-style" Islam for fatalistic tendencies, a disinclination to compete and a preference for spiritual over material pursuits.[21] But he said there was no reason why the Islamic faith, "properly interpreted", could not achieve spiritual well-being as well as material success for the Malays.[22]

  Although Dr. Mahathir had no claim to religious expertise — he was not educated in the Islamic school system or in Arabic[23] — with the help of expert assistants and advisers he described in some detail the way Islam should be redefined.[24] Drawing on Islamic texts, with verses quoted in Arabic, he took issue with Muslims who saw their religion as either opposed to modernity, or as the equivalent of socialism. He said, "Islam accepts the reality that in any society there will be rich and poor, king and commoner, leader and follower."[25] Despite the way the Qur'an reverberates with the ethos of social justice, as one analyst noted, Dr. Mahathir declared the teachings and spiritual values of Islam to be entirely compatible with the pursuit of materialism.[26] He said the ownership of property did not mean loss of spirituality, and Muslims "need not reject wealth or endeavours which lead to wealth...".[27] Indeed, Muslims must be equipped with knowledge and other "tools and skills of the modern world" to uphold spiritual values, for "without wealth and efficiency, the Muslims will be oppressed and finally spiritual values too will be lost".[28] Bottom line: Malays had almost a religious obligation to change their character and participate wholeheartedly in Malaysia's development.