Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Page 30
In other historical references, Dr. Mahathir held the rulers partly responsible for the Malays being dispossessed and colonized for "400 years". He said, "There was always a monarch who was prepared to help a foreign power for personal gain", noting that Singapore "came into being because one monarch" handed over "that part of the Johore empire".[21] And he never forgave the rulers for agreeing to British plans for the objectionable Malayan Union. Self-interested political groups were trying to disrupt Malay unity, he wrote in the 1970s, "Just as at one time monarchs without thrones were prepared to betray their people in their greed for power...".[22]
In 1983, Dr. Mahathir — and every other politician in Malaysia — could see more trouble coming in the form of the new king to be chosen in early 1984. Under the rotating system, it would be either Perak's or Johore's turn as all the other states had occupied the throne once. Both had sultans who were usually referred to as strong-willed, a euphemism for being prepared to ignore political advice when it suited them. Sultan Idris Shah of Perak had seniority, having assumed the throne earlier than his southern counterpart, but indicated he might decline the post as he had done twice before. He was insisting on constitutional changes that would allow him to remain Sultan of Perak while he was king, which the federal government said was out of the question.[23]
The alternative, having Sultan Mahmood Iskandar of Johore installed as Malaysia's eighth king, filled the political establishment with greater foreboding. It was not just that he was from a family with a history of defying the central government, his grandfather having ridiculed the idea of independence for the Malays in 1955. He also had a long record of criminal behaviour, exuded an aura of violence and inspired fear.[24] When a lawyer overtook the sultan's car on the road in 1972, he had the man stopped and beaten.[25] On separate occasions, he physically assaulted members of the Pahang and Trengganu royal families, apparently in the belief they were impersonating members of his family.[26] He once ordered a policeman who had offended him confined to a dog kenne1.[27] In the most controversial case, the sultan was convicted in 1977 of culpable homicide for the shooting of a man he said he thought was a smuggler. He was sentenced to six months imprisonment, but pardoned by his father and never spent a day in jai1.[28] Although he was the eldest son, he was removed as successor by his father in 1961. In mysterious circumstances, his father restored him to the line of succession on his deathbed at the age of 86.
As if the prospect of a wilful and politicized king were not enough, the government received reports that Sultan Mahmood Iskandar had boasted that he would, in effect, stage a coup d'etat after he was enthroned. He told a gathering that once elected king, he would declare a state of emergency unilaterally, take over with the help of the army and throw out all the politicians.[29]
According to an associate, Dr. Mahathir "had long nursed an ambition to settle this problem once and for all", after watching each of his predecessors "put up with the antics" of the rulers. Having to placate the Sultan of Pahang himself and payoff a ruler's gambling debts "strengthened his resolve to act quickly to put an end to it all".[30] The prospect that a rebellious king might frustrate Dr. Mahathir's legislative programme elevated a priority to "almost an obsession".[31]
Dr. Mahathir's pre-emptive strike, which was designed to do more than close constitutional loopholes before the installation of the next king, was titled the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1983. Introduced on 1 August, it contained three sensitive measures. The crucial one declared that if the king did not give royal assent to a bill passed by Parliament within 15 days, it would become law anyway. Similarly, state constitutions would be altered so that legislation passed by a state would become law after 15 days even if a ruler did not give his assent. Another amendment would transfer the right to declare a state of emergency from the king — acting on government advice, which implied consultation with the Cabinet — to the prime minister personally. The House of Representatives, by a 136-9 vote, adopted the package with minimal debate and delay. As he had obtained King Ahmad Shah's approval in advance, Dr. Mahathir hoped to wrap up the whole exercise before any serious opposition developed around the country.[32]
But the king had second thoughts when he saw the content of the bill, and consulted his fellow sultans. They were offended by being bypassed and objected to the substance as well. They persuaded him not to grant assent. The king made their collective displeasure known by withholding assent from a couple of other bills passed by Parliament as well. The very situation that the amendments were designed in part to prevent had become a reality, and the government faced a crisis.
Dr. Mahathir's secretive strategy, which led directly to the confrontation, contrasted sharply with his rhetoric about the importance of transparency during his first two years on the job. "I believe in open discussion and solving problems openly", he declared on one occasion. "Hiding things...does not take us very far."[33] Setting out to define strictly the powers of the rulers, however, Dr. Mahathir opted for a stealth seldom previously seen in national life.
The three contentious changes were buried among 22 constitutional amendments contained in the bill that was presented to Parliament. Contrary to an undertaking Dr. Mahathir had given to consult lawyers on all proposed laws, the bill was not made available beforehand to the Malaysian Bar Council.[34] The editors of local news organizations were summoned and instructed not to report the changes affecting the rulers. Government legislators played their part by also ignoring those amendments during two days of debate in the House, with the result that the public had almost no idea what was at stake. Lim Kit Siang, the leader of the opposition Democratic Action Party, called it a wayang kulit, a traditional shadow puppet play: "We see the shadows but not the substance...".[35]
Dr. Mahathir had several reasons for trying to sneak the changes through Parliament without publicity, and unknown to the sultans. The first reason was Article 38(4) of the Constitution, which stated flatly that "no law directly affecting the privileges, position, honours or dignities of the rulers shall be passed without the consent of the Conference of Rulers." Without their prior approval, the amendments more than likely were unconstitutional.
As leader of the exclusively-Malay UMNO, Dr. Mahathir also wanted to avoid alarming his core constituents. He could not afford to appear anti-monarchist, which might incense and alienate the rulers and be interpreted as less than totally pro-Malay. Even knowing his remarks would not be reported in the local papers, Dr. Mahathir was unwilling to admit that the powers of the rulers were being curbed. He argued implausibly that it was the executive which was surrendering some of its authority. In a constitutional monarchy, he said, formalities required everything to be done in the name of the king, who acted on the advice of the prime minister and Cabinet. With a 15-day limit for the king to sign bills, "the right of the Cabinet to advise the king is also gone after 15 days. It will mean it's the Cabinet that loses, not the king."[36]
For Lim Kit Siang, a trained lawyer representing a multiracial but predominantly Chinese party, the amendments were the most important since independence, with grave and far-reaching consequences. Eliminating the need for royal assent might be construed as a step towards a republican philosophy, he said. As for transferring the right to order a state of emergency to the prime minister, any such proclamation would be above the law, regardless of whether the premier acted in bad faith or wrongfully. Lim raised the dire possibility that those participating in the parliamentary debate might be guilty of sedition. "In excluding the need for the royal assent in certain circumstances, aren't we taking an action which would be tantamount to a derogation of the sovereignty of the rulers? Aren't we in fact challenging and questioning the sovereignty of the rulers...?"[37]
While Dr. Mahathir could hustle the bill through both houses of Parliament in three days, he could not persuade King Ahmad Shah to put his signature to it, so it was not published in the government gazette and did not become law. The king was in an invidious position: If he were tempted to a
ccede to the advice of the government of the day, he could be removed from office by a majority vote of the Conference of Rulers. A dismissal resolution supported by five fellow rulers would demote him from king to sultan, and send him packing back to Pahang.
The government also felt the pressure as the 22 amendments that remained blocked included day-to-day matters, such as ending civil appeals to Britain's Privy Council, expanding the scope of deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries, and increasing the number of parliamentary seats. Until the bill went through, the electoral authorities could not redraw the boundaries, and they might not be ready for the next general election. Among the other bills the king was ignoring to make his point was one containing the 1984 budget appropriations, which needed to be approved soon or the government would shut down.
The public, which had no knowledge of the stalemate for a couple of months, learned of it through an open letter by Senu Abdul Rahman, an UMNO veteran and former cabinet minister, who wrote to Dr. Mahathir opposing the amendments. Malay and English versions of his letter were widely distributed, sparking the sort of grass-roots ferment that Dr. Mahathir had sought to avoid. Tunku Abdul Rahman joined in the criticism in his weekly newspaper column. He declared that the bill contravened "one of the most important articles of our Constitution" — the one requiring Conference of Rulers consent for any law affecting the sultans.[38] Having rejected a personal appeal by Dr. Mahathir, the defiant rulers convened on 20 November at the court of the Sultan of Selangor, named Heavenly Hill Palace, in an ostentatious show of tradition and modernity to consider a compromise proposal delivered by an UMNO delegation:
It was a uniquely Malaysian gathering of the clans. The sultan of Perak packed a pistol on his hip and wore green combat fatigues and a red beret. The man who could be Malaysia's next king gave a jaunty clenched-first salute as he popped out of his Mercedes. The sultan of Johore, another ruler fond of firearms and the Perak sultan's main rival for the kingship, preferred more formal officer's dress. For security he traveled in a jet-black army sedan with blacked-out windows and brought along a special escort with a sub-machine gun. The sultan of Trengganu rolled up in an elongated golden Cadillac equipped with a television antenna in the shape of water buffalo horns. The raja of Perlis, a portly man in a rumpled beige suit, arrived in a more traditional chariot, a powder-blue Rolls Royce...[39]
Even before the rulers voted down the revisions, Dr. Mahathir reversed course and appealed directly to the public. His hastily assembled Plan B involved persuading the royalty that the vast majority of the Malays backed the legislation, and the rulers risked their prestige by resisting the tide. Dr. Mahathir and other leaders addressed rallies organized by UMNO that sought to evoke the spirit of the anti-Malayan Union campaign, with its overtones of the people coming to the rescue after royal perfidy. Party cheerleaders with bullhorns adapted the old battle cry "Hidup Melayu" for the new imperative "Hidup Mahathir".[40]
Where the press had obediently remained silent earlier, the papers now carried articles explaining the necessity of the constitutional amendments and reporting a groundswell of government support across the country. In fact, the Malay community was almost evenly split, with rural and elderly people — and women particularly — sympathetic to the monarchy. Royalists sponsored their own rallies, which were much better attended than the controlled press reported. The differences showed up within UMNO's senior ranks, with a party vice president and at least two cabinet ministers siding silently with the sultans.[41] Although he revelled in the rallies, Dr. Mahathir had uncomfortable moments. Criticized by sections of UMNO for being autocratic and ignoring traditions of consultation and consensus building, he was forced to deny that he would resign. Dr. Siti Hasmah noticed the tell-tale signs of stress in her husband, a reddening in the eye, and feared for his safety as large and enthusiastic crowds surged around him at meetings throughout the country. For the first and only time in his political career, she said, "both eyes were red".[42]
A settlement reached in early December was a compromise that pleased nobody beyond the relief it brought that the five-month confrontation had ended. In an embarrassing retreat, the government allowed the king to retain the formal right to declare an emergency, while the sultans' obligations to assent to state legislation were left unchanged, though they undertook orally not to block bills without reasonable cause. In his attempt to remove royal assent to legislation passed by Parliament, Dr. Mahathir actually gave the king an explicit legislative role for the first time.[43] Under the compromise, the king could no longer block legislation by refusing to sign it into law, though he would be able to delay it for at least two months. Once legislation was passed by Parliament, the king would have 30 days to sign it. If he objected to the bill within that period, he could return it to Parliament with a statement of his reasons for further consideration. If Parliament then reaffirmed support for the measure, it would be resubmitted to the king and automatically would become law after another 30 days. Money bills, an exception, would become law automatically after the initial 30-day period.
Government leaders could call the agreement a "triumph of rationality" and political maturity that did not favour either side, but it fell far short in Dr. Mahathir's terms.[44] While he gained a crucial legal point — depriving the king of the power to thwart the elected leadership by refusing to sign legislation — his victory was incomplete. Certainly it had not solved the problem of constitutional impropriety at state level, where it was acute. Politically, the episode dented Dr. Mahathir's standing, though if adversaries expected him to retreat, they still had much to learn about their leader. For someone of Dr. Mahathir's temperament and convictions, it was a case of unfinished business.
Although the government feared the worst when Sultan Mahmood Iskandar was made king in 1984, after Sultan Idris Shah died on the eve of the electoral conclave, he and Dr. Mahathir learned to coexist amicably after a few early bumps. The new king made a positive start by donating his and the queen's federal salaries to charity. He confirmed his eccentricity by refusing to live at the national palace in Kuala Lumpur, preferring the official residence provided by the state of Johore. He had to be talked out of wearing a military uniform and into traditional dress for his coronation. He shocked many Malays by demanding, after prayers at the National Mosque during Ramadan, that Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam, a Johore subject, apologize publicly for insulting him during the previous year's constitutional crisis. When Musa stood as directed, kissed the monarch's hand and apologized, the congregation broke out in applause. For the most part, though, the king performed dutifully, and he and Dr. Mahathir found it served their individual interests to cooperate. Indeed, Dr. Mahathir did nothing to expose a serious crime in 1987 — the king killed his golf caddy — which, if known, would have ruined and probably ended the king's reign. For his part, the king visibly acquiesced the following year in Dr. Mahathir's siege of the judiciary that left its independence in tatters.
In the states, however, some of the familiar frictions were at work. Kedah Chief Minister Syed Nahar Shahabuddin resigned, apparently a victim of the fallout from the constitutional crisis that left him uncomfortably opposed to his uncle, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the rulers.[45] The Sultan of Selangor had a public row with the state's chief minister, Muhammad Muhammad Taib, over land development, complicated by the terms of Muhammad's divorce settlement with the sultan's daughter.[46] In Kelantan, the situation was much more serious, with the sultan accusing the UMNO chief minister of being corrupt. The sultan was targeted by UMNO after his uncle, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, broke with UMNO and formed his own party, which contested the 1990 general election in alliances with Parti Islam Se-Malaysia and with another opposition party. Dr. Mahathir and his supporters blamed the sultan's "political interference" for the loss of all of Kelantan's 13 parliamentary seats and 39 Legislative Assembly seats, a body blow to UMNO's pride.
A more general and widespread complaint came from the growing ranks of Malay businessmen, n
ewly enfranchised by affirmative action policies, who found themselves shut out of some of the most lucrative investment fields by the web of interests associated with the royal houses. Young, self-confident and usually members of UMNO, these Malays saw little need to rely on the sultanates for symbolic protection. On the contrary, they resented the business competition, being particularly incensed by the alliances that some sultans had formed with established Chinese companies. According to Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, the rulers had no compunction about writing directly to him seeking government contracts.[47]
Malay concerns about the rulers' ventures into both politics and business spilled into the open at UMNO's General Assembly in 1990, resulting in a unanimous resolution urging the royal families to uphold the federal and state constitutions. Emboldened, the delegates at the party's gathering a year later advocated a royal code of conduct. Negotiated by UMNO representatives and the rulers, the seven-page Proclamation of Constitutional Principles issued by the king on 4 July 1992 was of limited value. It was murky on many points and signed by only six sultans — the Johore, Kedah and Kelantan rulers declined — and while they said they would stay out of politics, accept federal government appointments to their respective states and refrain from active involvement in business, the code lacked constitutional force.[48]
Realizing that the consensual approach had failed, the government laid the groundwork to use its two-thirds parliamentary majority to change the Constitution and compel the sultans to behave, even though it would require the consent of the Conference of Rulers.[49] With Dr. Mahathir's tacit approval, the Malaysian press abandoned the free ride it had long given the sultans and their offspring, pouncing instead on any royal indiscretion. In one case, the out-of-favour Sultan Ismail Petra of Kelantan attracted a torrent of publicity when he walked into the customs cargo centre at Kuala Lumpur's airport and drove off in a Lamborghini Diablo, without paying the RM2.1 million import duty on the sports car. The sultan had exceeded his duty-free quota of seven cars, the government tax authorities ruled, and he must pay up. Several local businessmen ended the incident by taking up a collection and settling the bill for him.[50]