Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Read online

  Eric Ellis, "Protonomics", Fortune, 10 July 2006, p. 20.

  R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 174.

  Chandran Jeshurun, Kuala Lumpur: Corporate Capital, Cultural Cornucopia (Kuala Lumpur: Arus Intelek Sdn. Bhd., 2004).

  Chandran Jeshurun, "Kuala Lumpur: The City that Mahathir Built", in Bridget Welsh, ed., Reflections: The Mahathir Years (Washington: Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2004), p. 392.

  Ibid., p. 392.

  Ibid., p. 392.

  R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 67.

  Chandran Jeshurun, "Kuala Lumpur: The City that Mahathir Built", p. 396.

  Ibid., p. 393.

  "Dare to Dream", excerpted from www.thestar.com.my, http://www.kiat.net/towers/dream.html (accessed 2 February 2007).

  Ibid.

  R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 67.

  Ong Soh Chin, "Dare We Build a True Icon?", Straits Times, 31 October 2006.

  Zainuddin Maidin, The Other Side of Mahathir (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn. Bhd., 1994), p. 279.

  Donald Morrison, Sandra Burton and John Colmey, "Mahathir on Race, the West and His Successor", Time Asia, 9 December 1996, p. 31.

  In retirement, Dr. Mahathir boasted, "Today there is nothing named after me except an orchid flower", adding, "I never liked personality cults." Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, "Fitnah", 15 February 2009, http://chedet.co.cc/chedetblog/2009/02/fitnah.html (accessed 20 March 2009).

  Patricia Martinez, "Mahathir, Islam, and the New Malay Dilemma", in Ho Khai Leong and James Chin, eds, Mahathir's Administration: Performance and Crisis in Governance (Singapore: Times Media Pte. Ltd., 2001), p. 216.

  Email correspondence with a Malaysian familiar with both Nobel Prize initiatives, 9-10 December 2008.

  John Funston, "Malaysia's Tenth Elections: Status Quo, Reformasi or Islamization?", Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (April 2000): 54.

  Chandran Jeshurun, "Kuala Lumpur: The City that Mahathir Built", p. 393.

  Leslie Lopez and Raphael Pura, "Anwar to Defer Large Projects, Cut Spending".

  Liew Chin Tong, "Malaysia's XXL-size cabinet", 27 August 2004, http://www.malaysiakini.com/opinions/43423 (accessed 28 August 2008).

  Anwar Ibrahim, "From the Halls of Power to the Labyrinth of Incarceration", p. 5.

  S. Jayasankaran, "The New Way: Think Small".

  Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, speech, "Malaysia Book of Records Awards Night", 6 June 2006, http://www.pmo.gov.my (accessed 22 January 2007).

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  (8)

  An Uncrowned King

  Before Dr. Mahathir became prime minister and consolidated his power, Malaysia's royal families could get away with murder. Constitutionally, the sultans, or rulers of the nine Malay states, were above the law and could not be subjected to any legal proceedings. Ignoring convention, they sometimes played politics, leveraged their positions for financial gain and indulged in fairytale-like extravagance at public expense. Although not meant to engage in commerce, they were actually so deeply involved that they were resented in the business community. If they transgressed too blatantly, the ruling UMNO leadership took up the matter with them in private. The two sides would reach an accommodation, usually on royalty's terms, as it suited the politicians to protect a system that was seen as essential to perpetuate Malay political dominance.

  Dr. Mahathir, who was critical of feudalism, did not object to the existence of a purely ceremonial monarchy.[1] As a commoner and politician, though, he was less tolerant of interference and excess by members of royal families than his blue-blooded predecessors. After a confrontation with the royals early in his prime ministership, he came to view the monarchy as a rival centre of power that had to be permanently restrained. His success in taming the monarchy in a bruising, episodic battle that extended over more than a decade gave him the chance to display his formidable political skills and grit.

  The failure of some of the sultans to stay within unwritten limits invited Dr. Mahathir to cut them down to size, which he did by reducing their standing in the eyes of the Malaysian public. Historically, the sultans were seen as the protectors of Malay interests, in return for which their subjects gave them unquestioned loyalty, though the rulers lost some of their prestige when they failed to back nationalist campaigns against the British colonial authorities. Dr. Mahathir had to overcome fear in the Malay community that his constitutional changes would undercut the privileged position of the Malays in a multiracial society in danger of being destabilized by the effects of modernization. His audacity in facing down the monarchs, diehard royalists and political opponents testified to how strongly he felt about his development agenda, and how ready he was to crush anyone or anything that got in his way.

  Dr. Mahathir's personal triumph, however, came at a cost to both constitutional development and missed opportunity to genuinely reform the feudalistic monarchy. Malaysia's separation of powers doctrine, with power divided among different organs of government — legislative, judicial and executive — provides for a system of checks and balances. The Conference of Rulers — comprising the Malay hereditary rulers of the nine states, who routinely choose one among themselves to serve a five-year term as king, and the appointed governors of four states — is part of the system. Dr. Mahathir's two major clashes with the monarchy upset the balance of powers by strengthening the executive at the expense of the rulers, the balance further skewed by his simultaneous subordination of the judiciary.

  Malaysia is one of four nation-states in Southeast Asia where once prevalent kingdoms, empires and principalities survived the depredations of Western colonialism or the nationalist revolutions it spawned. The nine royal houses were the remnants of as many as 30 small sultanates that prospered a thousand years ago along the Malay Peninsula. The grandest was Malacca, a great cosmopolitan trading port that flourished in the fifteenth century, before falling to European invaders. Surviving Malay monarchies benefited from indirect rule, in which colonial Britain found it expedient in the nineteenth century to impose control through traditional political structures. Outside Malacca and Penang, which were colonies where non-Malays formed a majority of the population, Britain kept the facade of royal legitimacy to simulate Malay political sovereignty. In reality, the sultans were obliged to accept the advice of a British official stationed in each state in all matters except Malay custom and the Muslim religion.

  British intervention strengthened the royal houses by centralizing power within each state and regularizing succession in a single line. Chiefs, who headed major regions and lower divisions down to village level, lost out. Provided with funds to carry out their royal duties as well as substantial personal allowances, the sultans saw their prestige rise along with their lifestyle. British recognition of the sovereignty of the sultans, amidst massive Chinese and Indian immigration, turned them into living symbols of the status of all Malays as the true sons of the soil.[2]

  After World War II and the Japanese occupation, the returning British introduced a radical plan that stripped the sultans of their sovereignty and combined the nine states with Malacca and Penang to form a single colony called the Malayan Union. Although Malay nationalists were able to mobilize and form UMNO to block the Malayan Union, the rulers stood accused of selling out. They had signed treaties transferring sovereignty to the British crown, and though they claimed they acted under duress, the demystification of the monarchy had begun.[3] Malay-language newspapers charged the rulers with betraying the Malays and committing treason. UMNO's first leader, Onn Jaafar, coined the cry "Hidup Melayu", long live the Malays, adapted from the familiar "Hidup Raja-raja Melayu", long live the rajas, kings. The rulers heeded an UMNO warning not to attend the inauguration of the Malayan Union in 1946, marking the point at which the will of the people prevailed over traditional power.[4]


  The Federation of Malaya, negotiated with the British by a joint committee of UMNO and the rulers and formed in 1948 to replace the Malayan Union, recovered the thrones for the sultans. They became constitutional monarchs, remaining the head of religion in their own states, to safeguard Malay rights and privileges and be symbols of Malay identity and paramountcy. Under the Federation of Malaya Agreement, the sultans had special veto powers on immigration, which could be employed to prevent a further influx from China and India. Each state got its own constitution, and the sultans governed in accordance with British advice as before. Non-hereditary governors were appointed in Malacca and Penang. Although each sultan exercised the authority of the state, it was a pure formality as he was required to give assent to bills passed by the state legislature.

  At independence in 1957, the Federal Constitution stipulated that a king would replace the British High Commissioner as head of state. The unique concept of the rulers regularly electing one among themselves to be Yang diPertuan Agong, king, was adopted at the suggestion of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first prime minister and head of UMNO. Malay supremacy was thus symbolically extended to the whole of Malaya, including Malacca and Penang, and to Sabah and Sarawak as well on the formation of Malaysia in 1963. The king was to give effect to provisions safeguarding "the special position of the Malays", such as fixing quotas in the civil service, schools and universities, and allocating scholarships and commercial licences, a duty he exercised in practice on the advice of the prime minister. The Conference of Rulers, which for some specific purposes consists of only the nine sultans, was given a veto over any laws directly affecting their "privileges, position, honours or dignities".

  Having stayed above the turbulent political fray in the 1960s, the rulers had their collective role strengthened when the Malaysian Parliament was restored in 1971, following its suspension at the time of the racial riots in 1969. Controversially, the Constitution was amended to require Conference of Rulers' consent in the passing of a number of important kinds of legislation, including some constitutional amendments. Principally, the laws entrenched in this way relate to matters popularly known as the "sensitive issues": citizenship, the special position of the Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak, and the legitimate interests of others, the national language and the rulers themselves.[5] Moreover, both the Constitution and the Sedition Act were amended to make it illegal to question these matters, even in Parliament. These severe restrictions were imposed on freedom of speech and expression to limit public discussion of topics that might again upset racial harmony. Reinforcing the rulers' position by adding "reassurance to assurance", as one analyst termed it, was part of a multi-pronged effort to make Malays feel more secure about their place in multi-ethnic Malaysia.[6]

  While the arrangements worked fairly well in the early years, there were signs that some of the rulers had not fully subscribed to the concept of constitutional monarchy. Based on the Westminster model, Malaysia's Constitution is one in which convention rather than law is a major source of rules.[7] The sultans had a different notion of their prerogatives from that which is scrupulously observed by their British counterparts.[8] For example, they found it hard to grasp that while they held "discretionary powers" to appoint the state political leader — the chief minister, known as mentri besar in the sultanates — it was no longer their prerogative to do so. According to the principles of constitutional monarchy, they were expected to accept the nomination of the ruling party, which usually meant the prime minister's choice. Similarly, giving royal assent to laws passed by elected state legislatures was supposed to be a formality. But some rulers still interfered in the appointment of chief ministers and members of executive councils, which functioned as state cabinets. They also lobbied hard and embarrassingly for increased personal allowances and handouts, while spending conspicuously and often frivolously.

  In 1963, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman reminded the sultans of Perak and Selangor, who were at odds with their state governments, that they were symbols and must steer clear of politics. The same year he also had to settle a fuss made by the Selangor sultan, who called a press conference to complain about conditions that the state government imposed on ten acres of land it granted him in Kuala Lumpur. Declaring himself personally insulted, he said, "As a ruler, I have power over land matters in the state of Selangor."[9] True enough, under the Federal Constitution land was a state responsibility — and a source of wealth as the Malaysian economy took off and the New Economic Policy kicked in — but control of land was devolved to elected politicians. Yet this sultan and others were able to exert considerable influence because the momentum of their traditional role carried over into what was ostensibly a fully representative and democratic system.[10] The Constitution notwithstanding, it was simply hard to say "no" to a ruler. In Kelantan in the 1970s, the sultan demanded and received a new palace "for his indulgence towards certain questionable dealings in timber and other concessions", by which Chief Minister Mohamed Asri Muda attempted to raise funds simultaneously for the state budget, his Parti Islam Se-Malaysia and private pockets.[11] As the New Economic Policy opened business opportunities for bumiputras, a similar "economic nexus in ruler-executive relations" spread to nearly every Malay state.[12]

  As the Father of Independence and a prince himself, Tunku Abdul Rahman was uniquely placed to offer gentle advice to erring sultans and their ever more numerous — and sometimes arrogant, wayward and avaricious — relatives. For the most part, though, the subject remained taboo, with potential critics deterred by the constitutional prohibition on questioning the sovereignty of the rulers, the widened Sedition Act, and a general belief that they were courting trouble if they spoke up. Chandra Muzaffar, a prominent intellectual, made a cautious case in 1979 for critically examining the behaviour of rulers. He said some aspects of the institution could — and should — be discussed in public: "The alleged utilization of public funds for private purposes, the apparent extravagance in lifestyles, involvement in businesses, interference in strictly political matters, the inability to uphold high ethical standards and most of all, the absence of an image of excellence which can inspire emulation...".[13] Although his study was a persuasive argument for a responsible public debate, it was not forthcoming.

  Dr. Mahathir's tenure as deputy prime minister coincided with a bout of "political activism" by the royalty, which began in the mid-to-late 1970s.[14] The Sultan of Kelantan persuaded the regent, who happened to be his son and crown prince, to postpone dissolution of the state legislature, recommended by Chief Minister Mohamad Nasir after he lost a no-confidence vote. The sultan was manoeuvring to keep Parti Islam Se-Malaysia in power without having an election, but the UMNO-led federal government stepped in amidst the turmoil and imposed central control on the state. In Perak, the sultan got rid of Chief Minister Mohamed Ghazali Jawi after a long campaign, expressing his delight by shaving off his protest beard and turning the occasion into a fireworks and drum-beating celebration for family members, civil servants and community leaders. A similar situation occurred in Johore, where the sultan prevailed on the federal government to remove Chief Minister Othman Saat.

  In the case of Pahang, Prime Minister Hussein Onn, who was committed to reducing corruption, imposed his choice of Abdul Rahim Bakar as chief minister on the protesting sultan. While the sultan sought to invoke the principle of consultation, with the implication of a possible veto, he was actually seeking a "malleable" chief minister who was "essential for the rapid or rule-bending processing of land alienation at preferential rates".[15] Already feeling slighted, the sultan was doubly annoyed to find the able and honest Rahim made life difficult for those who had in the past been able to acquire timber concessions through high-level local patronage.[16] After the sultan became king in 1979, his son, who was acting as regent in his absence, refused to sign money bills. With dozens of bills awaiting royal assent and important development projects threatened, Rahim finally quit in November 1981, by which time Dr. Mahathir
had taken over as premier.

  Having been involved in the tussle with the Pahang throne for more than three years, Dr. Mahathir felt the sting of the government's retreat. In case anyone missed the significance of Rahim's departure, the regent reminded them by signing the delayed Pahang bills almost immediately. Other instances of royal recalcitrance also embarrassed and disturbed Dr. Mahathir. His government had to bail out one ruler who lost heavily at gaming tables abroad.[17] The sultans of Perak and Johore, asserting themselves as head of religion in their states, clashed with the federal government over the date for the end of Ramadan. By determining the timing locally and using a different method, they ended up with a fasting month one day longer or shorter than the rest of the country, causing confusion among Malays and disrupting holiday arrangements.

  That Dr. Mahathir would respond forcefully to royal abuses was a matter of how and when, not if. He had never had much sympathy for the rulers. While writing as C.H.E. Det in his student days, Dr. Mahathir had warned them that too often they were on the wrong side of history. In 1949, he criticized the Conference of Rulers for rejecting UMNO's recommendation that a Malay commoner be appointed deputy high commissioner of the Federation of Malaya. The rulers' objection on the grounds that it would lower their dignity, he said, pitted them against "the people". The hitherto unquestioned devotion of Malays to their rulers was at stake: Unless the rulers changed their minds, "there is no doubt that they will lose, perhaps forever, the confidence and loyalty of their subjects".[18] Elsewhere, Dr. Mahathir also wrote of the "new force" of Malayan democracy that was likely to eclipse feudalism.[19]

  In The Malay Dilemma in 1970, Dr. Mahathir insinuated that the rulers in earlier centuries were more concerned about feathering their own nests than helping the Malays obtain a fair deal from visiting Indian, Arab and Chinese traders. He said the rulers appropriated "a certain portion of goods belonging to their subjects" and exchanged them for imported items, enabling them to amass "vast amounts of clothing and jewellery". He also said the Chinese merchants' "habit of giving expensive gifts to the ruling class ingratiated them with all levels of authority", facilitating a greater influx of Chinese merchant-adventurers and allowing a system of Chinese retail shops to penetrate "every nook and corner" and "become an established feature of life in the old Malay sultanates".[20]