Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Page 12

  Dr. Mahathir had learned from 1987, when the ruling political elite fractured over the Tengku Razaleigh-Musa challenge. By removing immediately any possibility that Anwar could make a return to UMNO politics, Dr. Mahathir was able to carry the party's top leadership with him. But lower level leaders and the party rank and file, as with Malay society and the country at large, were numbed, disbelieving and alienated. Several hundred thousand members abandoned UMNO in protest to join PAS or Keadilan, a new party established by Anwar's wife.

  In making Abdullah Badawi deputy premier, Dr. Mahathir implicitly drew attention to the toll that his prolonged, iron rule had taken on UMNO. As one study noted, he had defeated in masterful fashion every threat to his rule, burying in succession the dynamic and talented Musa, Tengku Razaleigh and Anwar.[89] In doing so, he had eliminated from the party just about any possible successor approaching their calibre. Almost no younger leaders had been promoted, apart from Anwar, not even through UMNO Youth. With the leadership pipeline clogged for so long by Dr. Mahathir, he turned to Abdullah, an experienced but bland former civil servant, who had sided against Dr. Mahathir in the 1987 split. Abdullah was 59, scarcely representing the hope of regeneration in a party in deep trouble.

  Appalled by the humiliation of Anwar, the Malays routed UMNO in the 1999 general election. While the National Front secured its two-thirds majority in Parliament, winning 148 of 193 seats, UMNO had its worst result ever. Its representation fell from 94 seats to 72, with four ministers and five deputies being defeated.

  UMNO's problem went beyond numbers. No longer able to claim confidently majority Malay support, the party's very legitimacy was in doubt. The best estimates put UMNO's share of the Malay vote at between 40 and 50 per cent. While most UMNO leaders advocated reforms to both party and government policies to meet public demands for improved governance that focused on Anwar's persecution, Dr. Mahathir objected to any concessions. He cracked down hard again on his political opponents, particularly PAS and Keadilan, prosecuting and jailing several leaders and restricting their attempts to mobilize. The measures included withdrawing petroleum royalty payments, amounting to more than RM800 million a year, from opposition-held Trengganu state, even though they were legally guaranteed. Dr. Mahathir was able to win stronger support from non-Malays worried about Islamic extremism after the "September 11" terrorist attacks in the United States. As prime minister, he was secure.

  Yet UMNO leaders and followers alike knew in their hearts that only Dr. Mahathir's departure would assuage Malay anger, as much of it was directed at him personally. Mindful of Anwar's fate, though, nobody who hoped for a future in the party was about to ask him to go. What they really needed was a Dr. Mahathir of three decades earlier, the one who dared speak bluntly to Tunku Abdul Rahman, to accept responsibility for the 1999 debacle and quit. Since acquiescing under pressure, even if it was unspoken, was anathema to Dr. Mahathir, party insiders tended to agree with hostile Internet analysts, who predicted he would die with his boots on. Anwar supporters began deriding him as "prime minister for life".

  Dr. Mahathir shattered the irresolution in his closing address to the UMNO General Assembly in June 2002, abruptly departing from his text to say he was resigning "from UMNO and all positions in the National Front". As he broke into sobs, supporters mobbed him at the podium, some of them also in tears, imploring him to remain — all live on TV. Dr. Mahathir was taken to a back room, and his deputy, Abdullah Badawi, appeared after an hour to say he had been persuaded to stay on. Later, it was announced that he would retire at the end of October 2003.

  For 16 months Dr. Mahathir stayed on in the position he had vowed to avoid, as a lame duck prime minister, making arrangements so that Malaysia would be run for the foreseeable future by his anointed leaders. He ensured that Abdullah faced no contest in UMNO elections before he became prime minister. Abdullah, in fact, was the first deputy president never elected to the post by the party, though he was "approved" under an arrangement that saw no challenge to the president or his deputy. Dr. Mahathir also extracted a public promise from the party's three vice presidents that they would accept Abdullah's future choice for deputy premier, and support that person unopposed in party elections. Dr. Mahathir made known his preference for Najib Razak as deputy, a choice confirmed by Abdullah in due course.

  As promised, Dr. Mahathir stepped down on 31 October 2003 in an atmosphere of near disbelief that his era was finally ending. By voluntarily surrendering power, he once more confounded his critics. While Dr. Mahathir did not retain any official government or party office, he said he would play an active role as an "ordinary" UMNO member, as if a person with his record could ever be considered ordinary. Rather, it was the new leadership that appeared less than life size. Recall that Abdullah was once a member of the Tengku Razaleigh-Musa Team B, and Najib had belonged to Anwar's Vision Team. "That...must make one wonder", observed political scientist Khoo Boo Teik, "if the going gets rough, whether history will repeat itself as tragedy or farce".[90] As it happened, it was a bit of both.

  Notes

  Clive S. Kessler, "The Mark of the Man: Mahathir's Malaysia after Dr. Mahathir", in Bridget Welsh, ed., Reflections: The Mahathir Years (Washington: Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2004), p. 16.

  In-Won Hwang, "Malaysia's 'Presidential Premier': Explaining Mahathir's Dominance", in Reflections, p. 67.

  Frank-Jurgen Richter and Thang D. Nguyen, eds, The Malaysian Journey: Progress in Diversity (Singapore: Times Editions-Marshall Cavendish, 2004), p. x.

  Interview with Musa Hitam, 3 January 2007.

  Rehman Rashid, A Malaysian Journey (Petaling Jaya: Rehman Rashid, 1993), pp. 172-173.

  Eddin Khoo and Jason Tan, "Transitional Times", Off the Edge, November 2005, p.23.

  Zainuddin Maidin, The Other Side of Mahathir (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn. Bhd., 1994), pp. 224-225.

  Rehman Rashid, A Malaysian Journey, pp. 171-172.

  John Berthelsen, "Malaysian Prime Minister Invents an 'Islamic Toilet'", Asian Wall Street Journal, 18 October 1984.

  Email correspondence with Mahathir Mohamad, 25 June 2008.

  Ibid.

  Interview with Siti Hasmah Mohamad Ali, 17 January 2008.

  Interview with Daim Zainuddin, 18 October 2007.

  Musa Hitam, "We Were Followers", Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 October 2003, http://www.feer.com/articles/2003/0310_09/p024region.html (accessed 19 January 2006).

  V.G. Kulkarni, S. Jayasankaran and Murray Hiebert, "Dr. Feelgood", Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 October 1996, p. 18.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 14 August 2007.

  "Mahathir on Race, the West and His Successor", Time Asia, 9 December 1996, http://www.time.com/time/asia/2003/mahathir/mahathir961209_intvu.html (accessed 27 January 2006).

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 20 March 2007.

  Ahmad Mustapha Hassan, The Unmaking of Malaysia: Insider's Reminiscences of UMNO, Razak and Mahathir (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2007), p. 65.

  John Funston, "Political Careers of Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim: Parallel, Intersecting and Conflicting Lives", IKMAS Working Papers (Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), no. 15 July 1998): i-iv, 1-32.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 31 March 2008.

  Mahathir Mohamad, Reflections on Asia (Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 2002), p. 113.

  Narayana N.R. Murthy, "A Hands-On Leader", Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 October 2003, http://www.feer.com/articles/2003/0310_09/p024region.html (accessed 19 January 2006).

  Interview with Musa Hitam, 1 April 2008.

  Interview with Siti Hasmah Mohamad Ali, 17 January 2008.

  Robin Adshead, Mahathir of Malaysia: Statesman and Leader (London: Hibiscus Publishing Company, 1989), p. 113.

  Cheong Mei Sui and Adibah Amin, Daim: The Man Behind
the Enigma (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1995), p. 140.

  Ibid., pp. 140-141.

  Interview with Siti Hasmah Mohamad Ali, 17 January 2008.

  Mahathir B. Mohamad, "Problems of Democratic Nation-Building in Malaysia", Solidarity (Philippines), October 1971.

  Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 29 May 2007.

  Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 21 March 2007.

  Cheong Mei Sui and Adibah Amin, Daim: The Man Behind the Enigma, (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1995), p. 30.

  Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 21 March 2007.

  Asia 1982 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd., p. 194.

  In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State Under Mahathir (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 129.

  Harold Crouch, Government & Society in Malaysia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p.38.

  R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 160.

  In-Won Hwang, "Malaysia's 'Presidential Premier': Explaining Mahathir's Dominance", in Reflections, p. 68.

  Asia 1984 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd., p. 212.

  Interview with Param Cumaraswamy, 3 April 2008.

  Ibid.

  Stephen Duthie, "Poll Proves Bruising for Malaysian Party", Asian Wall Street Journal, 22 April 1987.

  Stephen Duthie, "Mahathir Faces Hard Job on Party Unity", Asian Wall Street Journal, 27 April 1987.

  Param Coomaraswamy [sic], "Injustice for All", Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 October 2003, http://www.feer.com/articles/2003/0310_09/p024region.html (accessed 19 January 2006).

  Stephen Duthie, "New Detentions Net Malaysia's Chief Dissidents", Asian Wall Street Journal, 29 October 1987.

  Harold Crouch, Government & Society in Malaysia, p. 112.

  The last to be released, Lim Kit Siang and his son, Lim Guan Eng, spent 18 months in detention.

  Stephen Duthie, "New Detentions Net Malaysia's Chief Dissidents".

  In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics, p. 125.

  Ibid., p. 126.

  Ibid., p. 123.

  Asia 1988 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd., p. 180.

  Stephen Duthie, "Mahathir's Rift with Judiciary Worsens", Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 December 1987. Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the Asean Law Association General Assembly, University of Malaya, 26 October 1982.

  K. Das, Questionable Conduct (Kuala Lumpur: K. Das, 1990), p. 6.

  V.G. Kulkarni, Murray Hiebert and S. Jayasankaran, "Tough Talk: Mahathir Thrives on No-Nonsense Policies", Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 October 1996, p. 23.

  R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 47.

  Alan Friedman and Jonathan Gage, "Malaysia's Currency Controls will be Eased, Mahathir Promises", International Herald Tribune, 30 January 1999, http://www.iht.com/articles/1999/01/30/maha.t.php (accessed 14 December 2006).

  Dato Sri George Seah, "If UMNO-11 Appeal Had Been Heard...", Aliran Monthly, 2003: 11, p. 35.

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 31 March 2008.

  Interview with Param Cumaraswamy, 19 October 2007.

  Interview with Anwar Ibrahim, 15 August 2007.

  Reflections on the Malaysian Constitution (Penang: Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran Negara, 1987), p. 20.

  Parliamentary debates, House of Representatives, Malaysia, 8 December 1992, p. 11311.

  Phone interview with Salleh Abas, 24 August 2008.

  "Johor Sultan Seeks Forgiveness", Aliran Monthly, 1995: 4, p. 27, an English translation of a report in Harakah, 21 April 1995, p. 32.

  Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, "The Tun Salleh Saga", 6 June 2008, http://test.chedet.com/cgi-bin/mt/mt-search.cgi?search=salleh&IncludeBlogs=1 (accessed 28 August 2008).

  H.P. Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 60.

  Interview with Param Cumaraswamy, 19 October 2007.

  Beh Lih Yi, "If I don't Accept, I'll be Sacked", 1 October 2007, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/73038 (accessed 1 October 2007).

  Geoffrey Robertson, "Justice Hangs in the Balance", Observer, 28 August 1988.

  Tun Salleh Abas with K. Das, May Day for Justice (Kuala Lumpur: Magnus Books, 1989), p. xx.

  George Seah, "Lessons to be Learnt from the 1988 Judicial Crisis", Aliran Monthly, 2004: 8, p. 40.

  H.P. Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia, p. 57.

  Param Cumaraswamy, "Judicial Reforms Must Meet the Test of Constitutionality", Sun, 30 December 2008.

  Raphael Pura, "Rulings Spark Controversy in Malaysia", Asian Wall Street Journal, 25 August 1995.

  Untitled, undated anonymous 33-page document circulated in 1996, which High Court judge Syed Ahmad Idid Syed Abdullah Aidid later admitted writing, p. 1.

  Roger Mitton, "Courting Controversy", Asiaweek.com, 26 July 1996, http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0726/nat3.html (accessed 16 February 2006).

  H.P. Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia, p. 127.

  Ibid., p. 128.

  Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, "The Tun Salleh Saga".

  Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 20 March 2007.

  Interview with Mohamed Tawfik Ismail, 23 September 2006. Tawfik is the oldest son of a former deputy prime minister, the late Ismail Abdul Rahman. Dr. Mahathir later denied making the comment. He said Tawfik was dropped because of his "lacklustre performance". Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, "Fitnah", 15 February 2009, http://chedet.co.cc/chedetblog/2009/02/fitnah.html (accessed 20 March 2009).

  Gordon P. Means, "Malaysia in 1989: Forging a Plan for the Future", Southeast Asian Affairs 1990, p. 186.

  Eddin Khoo and Jason Tan, "Transitional Times", p. 25.

  In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics, pp. 173,203, fn 110.

  John Funston, "UMNO: What Legacy Will Mahathir Leave?", in Reflections, p. 135.

  Ibid., p. 135.

  R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 186.

  Khoo Boo Teik, "Who Will Succeed the Successor?", Aliran Monthly, 2003: 5, p. 6.

  * * *

  (4)

  The Vision of a Modern Nation

  Dr. Mahathir wasted no time in transforming Malaysia in line with his vision of a modern, industrialized nation, setting the goal of becoming fully developed by 2020. Once dominant primary commodities, already receding, gave way to the production of manufactured goods and the embrace of a high-tech future. With the economy expanding at an annual average rate of 6.1 per cent for the 22 years he was prime minister,[1] Malaysia was one of the developing world's most successful countries. It was all the more impressive for being a Muslim-majority nation, indicating that Islam could be compatible with representative government and modernization. That it was achieved while a comprehensive affirmative action programme was being applied to such an ethnically diverse population added lustre to Malaysia's internationally acclaimed success.

  As the government poured money into highways, airports, skyscrapers, bridges and container ports, Malaysians ditched their bicycles and motorbikes for cars and more cars. With manufacturing growing from about 30 per cent to more than 70 per cent of exports, Malaysia became an economic dynamo and one of the world's top 20 exporters. It even became an exporter of capital, investing in regions as diverse and distant as Eastern Europe, South Africa and China. The World Bank declared Malaysia, along with neighbours Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, part of East Asia's "economic miracle".[2]

  Actually, high growth rates in Malaysia were not new. Throughout the 1970s, the decade before Dr. Mahathir came to power, the country averaged an outstanding 8 per cent a year.[3] Under the tech-savvy and driven Dr. Mahathir, however, it was the transformation of the economy, with its modernizing effects, that was more palpable than the increase in gross domestic product (GDP), and more resonant in the public mind.[4] The expansion of industry, construction and finance changed the face of the economy and society
and fuelled what political economist Lee Hwok Aun called "a nationalistic fervour towards the development project".[5]

  With per capita GDP almost quadrupling to about U5$9,000 in purchasing-power parity terms, poverty was reduced dramatically. Malaysia experienced accelerated urbanization, and saw the emergence of a growing middle class that included a significant number of Malays. Change was most visible in Kuala Lumpur, where gleaming steel and glass towers sprouted, while mansions appeared alongside luxurious condominium blocks in residential areas to accommodate the newly rich and ostentatiously wealthy.

  Yet Malaysia's development under Dr. Mahathir was far from smooth. In seeking to industrialize, he directed Malaysians not to emulate the West but to "look east" and become a powerhouse like Japan, with their own steel mills, cement plants and a national car to clog the roads. Almost ten years of unprecedented prosperity, when Malaysia was the darling of international investors, opened and closed with severe recessions. To deal with the second contraction, the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, Dr. Mahathir defied International Monetary Fund (IMF) orthodoxy and introduced capital controls.

  Amid overall progress, signs of increasing inequality at the lower end of society were a cause for concern. While reducing the gap between the Malays and Chinese, the affirmative action New Economic Policy (NEP) was leaving the poorest Malaysians behind. The evidence suggested the NEP was being used — and abused — to channel benefits to better-off Malays, especially those closely connected with UMNO. No element was more controversial or politicized than privatization, where contracts were awarded to help build a Malay industrial and commercial class that was internationally competitive. Although a number of Malay entrepreneurs became household names, their companies faltered during the regional economic crisis, indicating they had failed to overcome their dependence on government support.